Constrained allocation of projects to heterogeneous workers with preferences over peers

Flip Klijn

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearch

    Abstract

    © 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston. We study the problem of allocating projects to heterogeneous workers. The simultaneous execution of multiple projects imposes constraints across project teams. Each worker has preferences over the combinations of projects in which he can potentially participate and his team members in any of these projects. We propose a revelation mechanism that is Pareto-efficient and group strategy-proof (Theorem 1). We also identify two preference domains on which the mechanism is strongly group strategy-proof (Theorem 2). Our results subsume results by Monte and Tumennasan (2013) and Kamiyama (2013) .
    Original languageEnglish
    Article number20170038
    JournalB.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
    Volume19
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2019

    Keywords

    • (group) strategyproofness
    • allocation
    • efficiency
    • heterogeneous agents
    • matching
    • preferences over peers

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