TY - JOUR
T1 - Compromising on Compromise Rules
AU - Barberà, Salvador
AU - Coelho, Danilo
N1 - Funding Information:
An earlier version of this article has been circulated under the title “On the selection of compromise arbitrators”. Salvador Barberà acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019‐000915‐S) and (SEV‐2015‐0563), from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness and FEDER through grants ECO2014‐53051‐P, ECO2017‐83534‐P and PID2020‐116771GB‐I00, and from the Generalitat de Catalunya, through grants 2014SGR—0515 and 2017SGR—0711. We thank Andrzej Skrzypacz, Douglas Bernheim, Florian Brandl, Egor Ianovski, Hervé Moulin, Matthew Jackson, Fuhito Kojima, Raul Lopez, Matias Nunez, Remzi Sanver, and Arkadii Slinko as well as participants at the Online Social Choice Seminar Series in 2020 organized by the Centre for Mathematical Social Science and Matthew Jackson's discussion group seminar in 2019 at Stanford University for useful comments.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022, The RAND Corporation.
PY - 2022/3/1
Y1 - 2022/3/1
N2 - We propose three mechanisms to reach compromise between two opposing parties. They are based on the use of Rules of k Names, whereby one of the parties proposes a shortlist and the other chooses from it. Methods of this class are used in practice to appoint Supreme Court justices and have been recently proposed for arbitration selection processes. Those we suggest are flexible and allow the parties to participate in the endogenous determination of the role of proposer and the shortlist size. They involve few stages, implement the Unanimity Compromise Set, and are robust to the strategic inclusion of candidates.
AB - We propose three mechanisms to reach compromise between two opposing parties. They are based on the use of Rules of k Names, whereby one of the parties proposes a shortlist and the other chooses from it. Methods of this class are used in practice to appoint Supreme Court justices and have been recently proposed for arbitration selection processes. Those we suggest are flexible and allow the parties to participate in the endogenous determination of the role of proposer and the shortlist size. They involve few stages, implement the Unanimity Compromise Set, and are robust to the strategic inclusion of candidates.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85123683399&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/2c36530a-b74e-3fe1-886f-11ebb5932679/
U2 - 10.1111/1756-2171.12401
DO - 10.1111/1756-2171.12401
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85123683399
VL - 53
SP - 95
EP - 112
JO - RAND Journal of Economics
JF - RAND Journal of Economics
SN - 0741-6261
IS - 1
ER -