Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game

David Pérez-Castrillo, Marilda Sotomayor

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearch

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

© 2019 Elsevier Inc. The multiple partners game (Sotomayor, 1992) extends the assignment game to a matching model where the agents can have several partners, up to their quota, and the utilities are additively separable. The present work fills a gap in the literature of that game by studying the effects on agents’ payoffs caused by the entrance of new agents in the market under both the cooperative and the competitive approaches. The results obtained have no parallel in the one-to-one assignment game.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)177-192
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume114
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2019

Keywords

  • Comparative statics
  • Competitive equilibrium
  • Matching
  • Stability

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