Communication and influence

Antoni Calvó-Armengol, Joan de Martí, Andrea Prat

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

    20 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    © 2015 Antoni Calvó-Armengol, Joan de Martí, and Andrea Prat. We study the information flows that arise among a set of agents with local knowledge and directed payoff interactions, which differ among pairs of agents. First, we study the equilibrium of a game where, before making decisions, agents can invest in pairwise active communication (speaking) and pairwise passive communication (listening). This leads to a full characterization of information and influence flows. Second, we show that when the coordination motive dominates the adaptation motive, the influence of an agent on all his peers is approximately proportional to his eigenvector centrality. Third, we use our results to explain organizational phenomena such as the emergence of work "cliques," the adoption of human resources practices that foster communication (especially active communication), and the discrepancy between formal hierarchy and actual influence.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)649-690
    JournalTheoretical Economics
    Volume10
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2015

    Keywords

    • Communication
    • Invariant method
    • Organizations
    • Team theory

    Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Communication and influence'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this

    Calvó-Armengol, A., de Martí, J., & Prat, A. (2015). Communication and influence. Theoretical Economics, 10(2), 649-690. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1468