Common interest and signaling games: A dynamic analysis

Manolo Martínez, Peter Godfrey-Smith

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

    11 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    © 2016 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved. We present a dynamic model of the evolution of communication in a Lewis signaling game while systematically varying the degree of common interest between sender and receiver.We showthat the level of common interest between sender and receiver is strongly predictive of the amount of information transferred between them. We also discuss a set of rare but interesting cases inwhich common interest is almost entirely absent, yet substantial information transfer persists in a “cheap talk” regime, and offer a diagnosis of how thismay arise.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)371-392
    JournalPhilosophy of Science
    Volume83
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jul 2016

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