Coexistence of cooperators and defectors in well mixed populations mediated by limiting resources

R. J. Requejo, J. Camacho

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Traditionally, resource limitation in evolutionary game theory is assumed just to impose a constant population size. Here we show that resource limitations may generate dynamical payoffs able to alter an original prisoner's dilemma, and to allow for the stable coexistence between unconditional cooperators and defectors in well-mixed populations. This is a consequence of a self-organizing process that turns the interaction payoff matrix into evolutionary neutral, and represents a resource-based control mechanism preventing the spread of defectors. To our knowledge, this is the first example of coexistence in well-mixed populations with a game structure different from a snowdrift game. © 2012 American Physical Society.
Original languageEnglish
Article number038701
JournalPhysical Review Letters
Volume108
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 19 Jan 2012

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