Balancing the power to appoint officers

Salvador Barberà; Danilo Coelho

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.005

Balancing the power to appoint officers

Salvador Barberà, Danilo Coelho

Institute of Applied Economic Research

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)

1 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Rules of k names are two-stage procedures where a first set of agents, the proposers, select k individuals from a set of candidates, and then another agent, the chooser, appoints one among those k in the list. The list of k names is often arrived at by letting each of the proposers vote for v candidates and then choosing those k with the highest support. We then speak of v-rules of k names. We study how different choices of the parameters v and k affect the balance of power between the proposers and the choosers. We analyze a strategic game where the proposers interact to determine what list of candidates to submit. We investigate the impact of the choice of parameters v and k upon the distribution of power among the proposers and the chooser, and we discuss how to eventually balance it.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	189-203
Number of pages	15
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	101
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.005
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2017

Keywords

Constitutional design
Rule of k names
Strong Nash equilibrium
Voting rules

Access to Document

10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.005Licence: C In Copyright

Fundamentos y práctica del diseño de mecanismos:teoría y aplicaciones
Massó, J., Barberà, S., Ballester Oyarzun, M. A., Beviá Baeza, M. D. C., Calsamiglia Costa, C., Miralles, A., Vila Carnicero, F. J. & Rodríguez Barraquer, T.
1/01/15 → 31/12/17
Project: Research Projects and Other Grants
Diseño institucional y buenas prácticas de gobierno: teoría, aplicaciones y simulación. INDAGO
Barberà, S., Ayllon Aragon, G., Balart Castro, P., Caramuta ., D., Filippos , L., Li , N., Merlino , L. P., Ozturk , T., Bervoets ., S. J., Beviá Baeza, M. D. C., Ballester Oyarzun, M. A., Calsamiglia Costa, C., Flamand ., S., Groenert ., V., Haeringer , G., Massó, J., Mukherjee ., S., Nozomu , M., Vila Carnicero, F. J., Gjorgjiev, R., Brown, D. J., Coelho, D., Jackson, M. O., Miralles Asensio, A., Neme, A. & Nicolo, A.
1/01/09 → 30/07/15
Project: Research Projects and Other Grants

Cite this

@article{5799989fb19d451bb40a9d4136d88233,

title = "Balancing the power to appoint officers",

abstract = "Rules of k names are two-stage procedures where a first set of agents, the proposers, select k individuals from a set of candidates, and then another agent, the chooser, appoints one among those k in the list. The list of k names is often arrived at by letting each of the proposers vote for v candidates and then choosing those k with the highest support. We then speak of v-rules of k names. We study how different choices of the parameters v and k affect the balance of power between the proposers and the choosers. We analyze a strategic game where the proposers interact to determine what list of candidates to submit. We investigate the impact of the choice of parameters v and k upon the distribution of power among the proposers and the chooser, and we discuss how to eventually balance it.",

keywords = "Constitutional design, Rule of k names, Strong Nash equilibrium, Voting rules",

author = "Salvador Barber{\`a} and Danilo Coelho",

note = "The authors gratefully acknowledge the support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grant “Consolidated Group-C” ECO2008-04756 and FEDER, from the Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament d{\textquoteright} Universitats, Recerca i Societat de la Informaci{\'o} through the Distinci{\'o} per a la Promoci{\'o} de la Recerca Universit{\`a}ria and grant SGR2009-0419. Salvador Barber{\`a} acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075) and grant ECO2014 53051-P. Danilo Coelho acknowledges the financial support from the Brazilian Ministry of Science Technology and Innovation, through CNPq Research Productivity Scholarship, grant no. CNPQ/PQ-2 302018/2012-3.",

year = "2017",

month = jan,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.005",

language = "English",

volume = "101",

pages = "189--203",

journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",

issn = "0899-8256",

publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Balancing the power to appoint officers

AU - Barberà, Salvador

AU - Coelho, Danilo

N1 - The authors gratefully acknowledge the support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grant “Consolidated Group-C” ECO2008-04756 and FEDER, from the Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament d’ Universitats, Recerca i Societat de la Informació through the Distinció per a la Promoció de la Recerca Universitària and grant SGR2009-0419. Salvador Barberà acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075) and grant ECO2014 53051-P. Danilo Coelho acknowledges the financial support from the Brazilian Ministry of Science Technology and Innovation, through CNPq Research Productivity Scholarship, grant no. CNPQ/PQ-2 302018/2012-3.

PY - 2017/1/1

Y1 - 2017/1/1

N2 - Rules of k names are two-stage procedures where a first set of agents, the proposers, select k individuals from a set of candidates, and then another agent, the chooser, appoints one among those k in the list. The list of k names is often arrived at by letting each of the proposers vote for v candidates and then choosing those k with the highest support. We then speak of v-rules of k names. We study how different choices of the parameters v and k affect the balance of power between the proposers and the choosers. We analyze a strategic game where the proposers interact to determine what list of candidates to submit. We investigate the impact of the choice of parameters v and k upon the distribution of power among the proposers and the chooser, and we discuss how to eventually balance it.

AB - Rules of k names are two-stage procedures where a first set of agents, the proposers, select k individuals from a set of candidates, and then another agent, the chooser, appoints one among those k in the list. The list of k names is often arrived at by letting each of the proposers vote for v candidates and then choosing those k with the highest support. We then speak of v-rules of k names. We study how different choices of the parameters v and k affect the balance of power between the proposers and the choosers. We analyze a strategic game where the proposers interact to determine what list of candidates to submit. We investigate the impact of the choice of parameters v and k upon the distribution of power among the proposers and the chooser, and we discuss how to eventually balance it.

KW - Constitutional design

KW - Rule of k names

KW - Strong Nash equilibrium

KW - Voting rules

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.005

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.005

M3 - Article

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 101

SP - 189

EP - 203

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

IS - 1

ER -

Balancing the power to appoint officers

Abstract

Keywords

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Projects

Fundamentos y práctica del diseño de mecanismos:teoría y aplicaciones

Diseño institucional y buenas prácticas de gobierno: teoría, aplicaciones y simulación. INDAGO

Cite this