Abstract
© 2015 Elsevier Inc. Rules of k names are two-stage procedures where a first set of agents, the proposers, select k individuals from a set of candidates, and then another agent, the chooser, appoints one among those k in the list. The list of k names is often arrived at by letting each of the proposers vote for v candidates and then choosing those k with the highest support. We then speak of v-rules of k names. We study how different choices of the parameters v and k affect the balance of power between the proposers and the choosers. We analyze a strategic game where the proposers interact to determine what list of candidates to submit. We investigate the impact of the choice of parameters v and k upon the distribution of power among the proposers and the chooser, and we discuss how to eventually balance it.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 189-203 |
Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
Volume | 101 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2017 |
Keywords
- Constitutional design
- Rule of k names
- Strong Nash equilibrium
- Voting rules