Autonomy and Monitoring

Marco a. Barrenechea-méndez; Pedro Ortín-Ángel; Eduardo C. Rodes

doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12164

Autonomy and Monitoring

Marco a. Barrenechea-méndez, Pedro Ortín-Ángel, Eduardo C. Rodes

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

Abstract

© 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of an under-explored consequence of granting autonomy to workers: monitoring. In the principal-agent model that we develop, granting autonomy allows workers to carry out innovative tasks in the workplace. Given that innovative tasks are more difficult to monitor, the model predicts a positive relationship between autonomy and monitoring. Relying on information about blue-collar workers coming from a dataset of Spanish industrial plants, we provide strong support for this prediction.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	911-935
Journal	Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
Volume	25
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12164
Publication status	Published - 1 Dec 2016

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AB - © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of an under-explored consequence of granting autonomy to workers: monitoring. In the principal-agent model that we develop, granting autonomy allows workers to carry out innovative tasks in the workplace. Given that innovative tasks are more difficult to monitor, the model predicts a positive relationship between autonomy and monitoring. Relying on information about blue-collar workers coming from a dataset of Spanish industrial plants, we provide strong support for this prediction.

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