TY - JOUR
T1 - Autonomy and Monitoring
AU - Barrenechea-méndez, Marco a.
AU - Ortín-Ángel, Pedro
AU - Rodes, Eduardo C.
PY - 2016/12/1
Y1 - 2016/12/1
N2 - © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of an under-explored consequence of granting autonomy to workers: monitoring. In the principal-agent model that we develop, granting autonomy allows workers to carry out innovative tasks in the workplace. Given that innovative tasks are more difficult to monitor, the model predicts a positive relationship between autonomy and monitoring. Relying on information about blue-collar workers coming from a dataset of Spanish industrial plants, we provide strong support for this prediction.
AB - © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of an under-explored consequence of granting autonomy to workers: monitoring. In the principal-agent model that we develop, granting autonomy allows workers to carry out innovative tasks in the workplace. Given that innovative tasks are more difficult to monitor, the model predicts a positive relationship between autonomy and monitoring. Relying on information about blue-collar workers coming from a dataset of Spanish industrial plants, we provide strong support for this prediction.
U2 - https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12164
DO - https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12164
M3 - Article
VL - 25
SP - 911
EP - 935
JO - Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
JF - Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
SN - 1058-6407
ER -