Assignment games satisfy the CoMa-property

Herbert Hamers, Flip Klijn, Tamás Solymosi, Stef Tijs, Joan Pere Villar

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

    20 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    A balanced game satisfies the CoMa-property if and only if the extreme points of its core are marginal vectors. In this note we prove that assignment games satisfy the CoMa-property. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78. © 2002 Elsevier Science.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)231-239
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume38
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2002

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