Artificial Adaptative Agents Play a Finitely Repeated Principal-Agent Game

X. Vilà, R. Conte (Editor), Hegselmann (Editor), R. (Editor), P. Terno (Editor)

Research output: Chapter in Book › Chapter › Research

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Simulating Social Phenomena
Place of Publication	Berlín (DE)
Pages	1-1
Volume	456
Edition	1
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 1997

Name	Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

Cite this

@inbook{4c19c9c530ce455cb6e8345b2d4f1c71,

title = "Artificial Adaptative Agents Play a Finitely Repeated Principal-Agent Game",

author = "X. Vil{\`a} and R. Conte and Hegselmann and R. and P. Terno",

year = "1997",

month = jan,

day = "1",

language = "English",

isbn = "3-540-63329-4",

volume = "456",

series = "Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems",

pages = "1--1",

booktitle = "Simulating Social Phenomena",

edition = "1",

}