Artificial Adaptative Agents Play a Finitely Repeated Principal-Agent Game

X. Vilà, R. Conte (Editor), Hegselmann (Editor), R. (Editor), P. Terno (Editor)

Research output: Chapter in BookChapterResearch

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSimulating Social Phenomena
Place of PublicationBerlín (DE)
Pages1-1
Volume456
Edition1
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 1997

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

Cite this

Vilà, X., Conte, R. (Ed.), Hegselmann (Ed.), R. (Ed.), & Terno, P. (Ed.) (1997). Artificial Adaptative Agents Play a Finitely Repeated Principal-Agent Game. In Simulating Social Phenomena (1 ed., Vol. 456, pp. 1-1). (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems)..