An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments

David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for transferable utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)296-308
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume127
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2006

Keywords

  • Consistency
  • Fairness
  • Non-transferable utility games
  • Ordinal Shapley value
  • Shapley value

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