All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof

Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review


For division problems with single-peaked preferences, we show that all sequential allotment rules, a large subfamily of strategy-proof and efficient rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategyproofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages55
JournalTheoretical Economics
Publication statusAccepted in press - 2023


  • Obvious Strategy-proofness
  • Sequential Allotment Rules
  • Division Problems
  • Single-peaked Preference


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