All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof

Pablo  Arribillaga; Jordi Massó; Alejandro Neme

All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof

Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

Abstract

For division problems with single-peaked preferences, we show that all sequential allotment rules, a large subfamily of strategy-proof and efficient rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategyproofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.

Original language	English
Number of pages	55
Journal	Theoretical Economics
Publication status	Accepted in press - 2023

Keywords

Obvious Strategy-proofness
Sequential Allotment Rules
Division Problems
Single-peaked Preference

Cite this

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title = "All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof",

abstract = "For division problems with single-peaked preferences, we show that all sequential allotment rules, a large subfamily of strategy-proof and efficient rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategyproofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting. ",

keywords = "Obvious Strategy-proofness; Sequential Allotment Rules; Divi- sion Problems; Single-peaked Preferences., Obvious Strategy-proofness, Sequential Allotment Rules, Division Problems, Single-peaked Preference",

author = "Pablo Arribillaga and Jordi Mass{\'o} and Alejandro Neme",

note = "Arribillaga and Neme acknowledge financial support from the UNSL (grant 032016), the CONICET (grant PIP112-200801-00655), and the Agencia I+D+i (grant PICT2017-2355). Mass{\'o} and Neme acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (grant PID2020-116771GB-I00). Mass{\'o} acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigaci{\'o}n (AEI), through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S), and the Generalitat de Catalunya (grant SGR2017-711).",

year = "2023",

language = "English",

journal = "Theoretical Economics",

issn = "1555-7561",

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T1 - All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof

AU - Arribillaga, Pablo

AU - Massó, Jordi

AU - Neme, Alejandro

N1 - Arribillaga and Neme acknowledge financial support from the UNSL (grant 032016), the CONICET (grant PIP112-200801-00655), and the Agencia I+D+i (grant PICT2017-2355). Massó and Neme acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (grant PID2020-116771GB-I00). Massó acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S), and the Generalitat de Catalunya (grant SGR2017-711).

PY - 2023

Y1 - 2023

N2 - For division problems with single-peaked preferences, we show that all sequential allotment rules, a large subfamily of strategy-proof and efficient rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategyproofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.

AB - For division problems with single-peaked preferences, we show that all sequential allotment rules, a large subfamily of strategy-proof and efficient rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategyproofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.

KW - Obvious Strategy-proofness; Sequential Allotment Rules; Divi- sion Problems; Single-peaked Preferences.

KW - Obvious Strategy-proofness

KW - Sequential Allotment Rules

KW - Division Problems

KW - Single-peaked Preference

UR - https://econtheory.org/

M3 - Article

SN - 1555-7561

JO - Theoretical Economics

JF - Theoretical Economics

ER -

All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof

Abstract

Keywords

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ELECCION SOCIAL, REDES Y BIENESTAR: TEORIA Y APLICACIONES

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All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof

Abstract

Keywords

Other files and links

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ELECCION SOCIAL, REDES Y BIENESTAR: TEORIA Y APLICACIONES

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