A simple selling and buying procedure

David Pérez-Castrillo, Marilda Sotomayor

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

15 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

For the assignment game, we analyze the following mechanism. Sellers, simultaneously, fix their prices first. Then buyers, sequentially, decide which object to buy. Also, each buyer may report his or her indifferences (along with the previous buyers' indifferences) to the following buyer. The first phase determines the potential prices, while the second phase determines the actual matching. Reporting truthfully the indifferences is always a dominant strategy for the buyers. Moreover, when buyers state their true indifferences, the subgame perfect equilibria outcomes of the mechanism correspond to the maximum equilibrium price vector together with optimal matchings. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D78. © 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)461-474
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume103
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2002

Keywords

  • Assignment model
  • Implementation
  • Matching model
  • Mechanism

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