A pseudo-market approach to allocation with priorities

Yinghua He; Antonio Miralles; Marek Pycia; Jianye Yan

doi:10.1257/mic.20150259

A pseudo-market approach to allocation with priorities

Yinghua He, Antonio Miralles, Marek Pycia, Jianye Yan

Department of Economics and Economic History

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

© 2018 American Economic Association. We propose a pseudo-market mechanism for no-monetary-transfer allocation of indivisible objects based on priorities such as those in school choice. Agents are given token money, face priority-specific prices, and buy utility-maximizing random assignments. The mechanism is asymptotically incentive compatible, and the resulting assignments are fair and constrained Pareto efficient. Hylland and Zeckhauser's (1979) position-allocation problem is a special case of our framework, and our results on incentives and fairness are also new in their classical setting.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	272-314
Journal	American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Volume	10
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150259
Publication status	Published - 1 Aug 2018

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AB - © 2018 American Economic Association. We propose a pseudo-market mechanism for no-monetary-transfer allocation of indivisible objects based on priorities such as those in school choice. Agents are given token money, face priority-specific prices, and buy utility-maximizing random assignments. The mechanism is asymptotically incentive compatible, and the resulting assignments are fair and constrained Pareto efficient. Hylland and Zeckhauser's (1979) position-allocation problem is a special case of our framework, and our results on incentives and fairness are also new in their classical setting.

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