TY - JOUR
T1 - A pseudo-market approach to allocation with priorities
AU - He, Yinghua
AU - Miralles, Antonio
AU - Pycia, Marek
AU - Yan, Jianye
PY - 2018/8/1
Y1 - 2018/8/1
N2 - © 2018 American Economic Association. We propose a pseudo-market mechanism for no-monetary-transfer allocation of indivisible objects based on priorities such as those in school choice. Agents are given token money, face priority-specific prices, and buy utility-maximizing random assignments. The mechanism is asymptotically incentive compatible, and the resulting assignments are fair and constrained Pareto efficient. Hylland and Zeckhauser's (1979) position-allocation problem is a special case of our framework, and our results on incentives and fairness are also new in their classical setting.
AB - © 2018 American Economic Association. We propose a pseudo-market mechanism for no-monetary-transfer allocation of indivisible objects based on priorities such as those in school choice. Agents are given token money, face priority-specific prices, and buy utility-maximizing random assignments. The mechanism is asymptotically incentive compatible, and the resulting assignments are fair and constrained Pareto efficient. Hylland and Zeckhauser's (1979) position-allocation problem is a special case of our framework, and our results on incentives and fairness are also new in their classical setting.
U2 - 10.1257/mic.20150259
DO - 10.1257/mic.20150259
M3 - Article
VL - 10
SP - 272
EP - 314
JO - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
JF - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
SN - 1945-7669
IS - 3
ER -