A pseudo-market approach to allocation with priorities

Yinghua He, Antonio Miralles, Marek Pycia, Jianye Yan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

14 Citations (Scopus)


© 2018 American Economic Association. We propose a pseudo-market mechanism for no-monetary-transfer allocation of indivisible objects based on priorities such as those in school choice. Agents are given token money, face priority-specific prices, and buy utility-maximizing random assignments. The mechanism is asymptotically incentive compatible, and the resulting assignments are fair and constrained Pareto efficient. Hylland and Zeckhauser's (1979) position-allocation problem is a special case of our framework, and our results on incentives and fairness are also new in their classical setting.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)272-314
JournalAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 1 Aug 2018


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