A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games

Salvador Barberà; Anke Gerber

doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.09.018

A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games

Salvador Barberà, Anke Gerber

University of Zurich

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as "resting points" in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	85-90
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	95
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.09.018
Publication status	Published - Apr 2007

Keywords

Coalition formation
Hedonic game
Stability

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abstract = "We show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that {"}solutions{"} to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as {"}resting points{"} in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted. {\textcopyright} 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.",

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AB - We show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as "resting points" in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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KW - Hedonic game

KW - Stability

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IS - 1

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A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games

Abstract

Keywords

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