A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games

Salvador Barberà, Anke Gerber

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as "resting points" in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)85-90
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume95
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2007

Keywords

  • Coalition formation
  • Hedonic game
  • Stability

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