A Note on Reputation:: More on the Chain-Store Paradox

Jordi Massó

doi:10.1006/game.1996.0059

A Note on Reputation: More on the Chain-Store Paradox

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

Abstract

This note considers the reputation phenomenon in the context of the Chain-Store Paradox. Two major aspects of the perfect information assumption are relaxed: potential entrants do not know the ordering in which they have to make their entry decisions and they do not have full knowledge of the past history of the market. It is shown that, without introducing private information or changing the nature of the conflict, there exist sequential equilibria of the game with imperfect information in which the monopolist is willing to build reputation.

Original language	English
Article number	0059
Pages (from-to)	55-81
Number of pages	27
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	15
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0059
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 1996

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10.1006/game.1996.0059Licence: Unspecified

Comportaments estratègics i disseny de mecanismes
Barberà, S., Macho Stadler, I., Martínez Giralt, X., Massó, J., Olivella, P., Perez Castrillo, J. D., Ponsati Obiols, C. & Vila Carnicero, F. J.
2/06/93 → 2/06/97
Project: Research Projects and Other Grants
Estudis sobre comportament estratègic: teoria de jocs, aplicacions i experiments
Barberà, S., Burguet Verde, R., Fradera Garriga, I., Macho Stadler, I., Massó, J., Olivella, P., Perez Castrillo, J. D., Petith , H. C. & Ponsati Obiols, C.
2/08/90 → 2/08/93
Project: Research Projects and Other Grants
Competència imperfecta i mercats financers
Matutes Juan, C., Caballé, J., Martínez Giralt, X. & Massó, J.
1/01/90 → 31/12/93
Project: Research Projects and Other Grants

Cite this

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title = "A Note on Reputation:: More on the Chain-Store Paradox",

abstract = "This note considers the reputation phenomenon in the context of the Chain-Store Paradox. Two major aspects of the perfect information assumption are relaxed: potential entrants do not know the ordering in which they have to make their entry decisions and they do not have full knowledge of the past history of the market. It is shown that, without introducing private information or changing the nature of the conflict, there exist sequential equilibria of the game with imperfect information in which the monopolist is willing to build reputation.",

author = "Jordi Mass{\'o}",

note = "Financial support from Research Grants PB89–0075, PB89–0294, and PB92–0590 from the Direcci{\'o}n General de la Investigac{\'o}n Cientif{\'i}ca y T{\'e}cnica, Spanish Ministry of Education, is acknowledged.",

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AB - This note considers the reputation phenomenon in the context of the Chain-Store Paradox. Two major aspects of the perfect information assumption are relaxed: potential entrants do not know the ordering in which they have to make their entry decisions and they do not have full knowledge of the past history of the market. It is shown that, without introducing private information or changing the nature of the conflict, there exist sequential equilibria of the game with imperfect information in which the monopolist is willing to build reputation.

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DO - 10.1006/game.1996.0059

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A Note on Reputation: More on the Chain-Store Paradox

Abstract

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Projects

Comportaments estratègics i disseny de mecanismes

Estudis sobre comportament estratègic: teoria de jocs, aplicacions i experiments

Competència imperfecta i mercats financers

Cite this