A Note on Reputation: More on the Chain-Store Paradox

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This note considers the reputation phenomenon in the context of the Chain-Store Paradox. Two major aspects of the perfect information assumption are relaxed: potential entrants do not know the ordering in which they have to make their entry decisions and they do not have full knowledge of the past history of the market. It is shown that, without introducing private information or changing the nature of the conflict, there exist sequential equilibria of the game with imperfect information in which the monopolist is willing to build reputation.
Original languageEnglish
Article number0059
Pages (from-to)55-81
Number of pages27
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 1996


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