A model of elitist qualification

Miguel A. Ballester, José Luis García-Lapresta

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7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper deals with the collective qualification of members of society as belonging to a certain category or group based on a fixed attribute. Our model contains three main features: the existence of individual gradual opinions, the notion of elitism (only the opinions of certain individuals are taken into account to delineate the reference group), and the idea of sequentiality (elites are successively created by using the previous elites' opinions on a social decision scheme). The main results of the paper characterize when this sequential procedure converges for some intuitive ways of aggregating individual opinions. Finally, we analyze the role of convergence for two extra basic properties (symmetry and contractiveness) that elitist rules should possess. © 2008 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)497-513
JournalGroup Decision and Negotiation
Volume17
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2008

Keywords

  • Consensus
  • Gradual assessments
  • Liberalism
  • Sequential elitism
  • Social choice
  • Social identity
  • Voting systems

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    Ballester, M. A., & García-Lapresta, J. L. (2008). A model of elitist qualification. Group Decision and Negotiation, 17(6), 497-513. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-008-9108-z