A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem

Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, "tops-onlyness", and continuity. These domains (called partially single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)187-206
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume23
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2004

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