Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

Jose Apesteguia; Miguel A. Ballester

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.032

Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

Jose Apesteguia, Miguel A. Ballester

Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica

Producció científica: Contribució a revista › Article › Recerca › Avaluat per experts

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Resum

Abdulkadiroglu etal. (2011) show that some naive participants may be better off under the Boston mechanism than under deferred acceptance. Here we show that under the veil of ignorance all naive students may prefer the Boston mechanism. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.

Idioma original	Anglès
Pàgines (de-a)	172-174
Revista	Economics Letters
Volum	115
Número	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.032
Estat de la publicació	Publicada - 1 de maig 2012

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10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.032

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https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84855775696

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@article{337b319560724beaa5ec5b1a4fa42bda,

title = "Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice",

abstract = "Abdulkadiroglu etal. (2011) show that some naive participants may be better off under the Boston mechanism than under deferred acceptance. Here we show that under the veil of ignorance all naive students may prefer the Boston mechanism. {\textcopyright} 2011 Elsevier B.V.",

keywords = "Naive players, School choice, Veil of ignorance, Welfare",

author = "Jose Apesteguia and Ballester, \{Miguel A.\}",

year = "2012",

month = may,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.032",

language = "English",

volume = "115",

pages = "172--174",

journal = "Economics Letters",

issn = "0165-1765",

publisher = "Elsevier",

number = "2",

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TY - JOUR

T1 - Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

AU - Apesteguia, Jose

AU - Ballester, Miguel A.

PY - 2012/5/1

Y1 - 2012/5/1

N2 - Abdulkadiroglu etal. (2011) show that some naive participants may be better off under the Boston mechanism than under deferred acceptance. Here we show that under the veil of ignorance all naive students may prefer the Boston mechanism. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.

AB - Abdulkadiroglu etal. (2011) show that some naive participants may be better off under the Boston mechanism than under deferred acceptance. Here we show that under the veil of ignorance all naive students may prefer the Boston mechanism. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.

KW - Naive players

KW - School choice

KW - Veil of ignorance

KW - Welfare

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84855775696

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.032

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.032

M3 - Article

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 115

SP - 172

EP - 174

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 2

ER -

Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

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