(Weak) Pairwise Justifiability as a Common Root of Arrow’s and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems

S. Barberà, Dolors Berga*, Bernardo Moreno, Antonio Nicolò

*Autor corresponent d’aquest treball

Producció científica: Working PaperWorking paper

Resum

We introduce a novel principle that we call pairwise justifiability, which applies to a large class of collective choice rules, including the social choice functions and the social welfare functions about which the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem and Arrow’s impossibility theorem are predicated, respectively. We prove that, under appropriate qualifications, our principle is a common root for these two classical results, when applied to rules defined over the full domain of weak preference orders.
Idioma originalEnglish
Estat de la publicacióPublicada - 10 d’abr. 2023

Sèrie de publicacions

NomSSRN
EditorSocial Science Research Network
Núm.4497078

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