Voting by committees under constraints

Salvador Barberà; Jordi Massó; Alejandro Neme

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.006

Voting by committees under constraints

Salvador Barberà, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme

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Resum

We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.

Idioma original	Anglès
Pàgines (de-a)	185-205
Revista	Journal of Economic Theory
Volum	122
Número	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.006
Estat de la publicació	Publicada - de juny 2005

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10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.006Llicència: C In Copyright

https://ddd.uab.cat/record/142702Llicència: C In Copyright

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title = "Voting by committees under constraints",

abstract = "We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable. ",

keywords = "Additive and separable preferences, Strategy-proofness, Voting",

author = "Salvador Barber{\`a} and Jordi Mass{\'o} and Alejandro Neme",

year = "2005",

month = jun,

doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.006",

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T1 - Voting by committees under constraints

AU - Barberà, Salvador

AU - Massó, Jordi

AU - Neme, Alejandro

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AB - We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.

KW - Additive and separable preferences

KW - Strategy-proofness

KW - Voting

U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.006

DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.006

M3 - Article

SN - 0022-0531

VL - 122

SP - 185

EP - 205

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

IS - 2

ER -

Voting by committees under constraints

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