The division problem under constraints

Gustavo Bergantiños; Jordi Massó; Alejandro Neme

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.002

The division problem under constraints

Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme

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Resum

The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single-peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. We characterize axiomatically the family of extended uniform rules proposed to solve the division problem under constraints. Rules in this family extend the uniform rule used to solve the classical division problem without constraints. We show that the family of all extended uniform rules coincides with the set of rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, bound monotonicity, consistency, and independence of irrelevant coalitions.

Idioma original	Anglès
Pàgines (de-a)	56-77
Revista	Games and Economic Behavior
Volum	89
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.002
Estat de la publicació	Publicada - 1 de gen. 2015

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10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.002Llicència: C In Copyright

https://ddd.uab.cat/record/182477Llicència: C In Copyright

1 Acabat

Diseño institucional y buenas prácticas de gobierno: teoría, aplicaciones y simulación. INDAGO
Barberà, S. (PI), Ayllon Aragon, G. (Becari/a), Balart Castro, P. (Becari/a), Caramuta ., D. (Becari/a), Filippos , L. (Becari/a), Gjorgjiev, R. (Becari/a), Li , N. (Becari/a), Merlino , L. P. (Becari/a), Ozturk , T. (Becari/a), Bervoets ., S. J. (Investigador/a contractat/da), Beviá Baeza, M. D. C. (Investigador/a contractat/da), Ballester Oyarzun, M. A. (Investigador/a), Brown, D. J. (Investigador/a), Calsamiglia Costa, C. (Investigador/a), Coelho, D. (Investigador/a), Flamand ., S. (Investigador/a), Groenert ., V. (Investigador/a), Haeringer , G. (Investigador/a), Jackson, M. O. (Investigador/a), Massó, J. (Investigador/a), Miralles Asensio, A. (Investigador/a), Mukherjee ., S. (Investigador/a), Neme, A. (Investigador/a), Nicolo, A. (Investigador/a), Nozomu , M. (Investigador/a) & Vila Carnicero, F. J. (Investigador/a)
Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (MEC)
1/01/09 → 30/07/15
Projecte: Projectes i Ajuts a la Recerca

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abstract = "The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single-peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. We characterize axiomatically the family of extended uniform rules proposed to solve the division problem under constraints. Rules in this family extend the uniform rule used to solve the classical division problem without constraints. We show that the family of all extended uniform rules coincides with the set of rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, bound monotonicity, consistency, and independence of irrelevant coalitions.",

keywords = "Division problem, Single-peaked preferences",

author = "Gustavo Berganti{\~n}os and Jordi Mass{\'o} and Alejandro Neme",

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AB - The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single-peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. We characterize axiomatically the family of extended uniform rules proposed to solve the division problem under constraints. Rules in this family extend the uniform rule used to solve the classical division problem without constraints. We show that the family of all extended uniform rules coincides with the set of rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, bound monotonicity, consistency, and independence of irrelevant coalitions.

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KW - Single-peaked preferences

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The division problem under constraints

Resum

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Diseño institucional y buenas prácticas de gobierno: teoría, aplicaciones y simulación. INDAGO

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