Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues

Bhaskar Dutta, Jordi Massó

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Resum

In the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market (the institutions) can each be matched to a set of agents (the individuals) on the other side of the market, and the individuals only have preferences defined over institutions to which they can be matched. We explicitly study the consequences for stability when the composition of one's co-workers or colleagues can affect the preferences over institutions.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: J41. © 1997 Academic Press.
Idioma originalAnglès
Número d’articleET972291
Pàgines (de-a)464-475
Nombre de pàgines12
RevistaJournal of Economic Theory
Volum75
Número2
DOIs
Estat de la publicacióPublicada - 1 d’ag. 1997

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