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In the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market (the institutions) can each be matched to a set of agents (the individuals) on the other side of the market, and the individuals only have preferences defined over institutions to which they can be matched. We explicitly study the consequences for stability when the composition of one's co-workers or colleagues can affect the preferences over institutions.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: J41. © 1997 Academic Press.
Idioma original | Anglès |
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Número d’article | ET972291 |
Pàgines (de-a) | 464-475 |
Nombre de pàgines | 12 |
Revista | Journal of Economic Theory |
Volum | 75 |
Número | 2 |
DOIs | |
Estat de la publicació | Publicada - 1 d’ag. 1997 |
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Comportaments estratègics i disseny de mecanismes
Barberà, S. (PI), Macho Stadler, I. (Investigador/a), Martínez Giralt, X. (Investigador/a), Massó, J. (Investigador/a), Olivella, P. (Investigador/a), Perez Castrillo, J. D. (Investigador/a), Ponsati Obiols, C. (Investigador/a) & Vila Carnicero, F. J. (Investigador/a)
Dirección General de Investigación Científica y Técnica (DGICyT)
2/06/93 → 2/06/97
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