Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings

Jordi Massó; Ruth Martínez; Alejandro Neme; Jorge Oviedo

doi:10.1006/jeth.1999.2586

Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings

Jordi Massó, Ruth Martínez, Alejandro Neme, Jorge Oviedo

Producció científica: Contribució a revista › Article › Recerca › Avaluat per experts

34 Cites (Scopus)

Resum

Some properties of the set of many-to-one stable matchings for firms that have responsive preferences and quotas are not necessarily true when firms' preferences are substitutable. In particular, we provide examples in which firms have substitutable preferences but firms and workers may be "single" in one stable matching and matched in another one. We identify a set of axioms on firms' preferences guaranteeing that the set of unmatched agents is the same under every stable matching. We also propose a weaker condition than responsiveness, called separability with quotas or q-separability, that together with substitutability implies this set of axioms. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: J41. © 2000 Academic Press.

Idioma original	Anglès
Pàgines (de-a)	91-105
Nombre de pàgines	15
Revista	Journal of economic theory
Volum	91
Número	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2586
Estat de la publicació	Publicada - 1 de març 2000

Accés al document

10.1006/jeth.1999.2586Llicència: No especificat

https://ddd.uab.cat/record/143648

Altres arxius i enllaços

https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0002246612

Cooperació i Competència: Estudis sobre el comportament estratègic i el disseny institucional
Barberà, S. (Investigador/a principal), Berga Colom, D. (Becari/a), Bogomolnaia, A. (Becari/a), Caballero Jurado, J. (Becari/a), Villar Febré, J. P. (Becari/a), Beviá Baeza, M. D. C. (Investigador/a), Cardona Coll, D. (Investigador/a), Gonzalez Maestre, M. (Investigador/a), Jelovac ., I. (Investigador/a), Macho Stadler, I. (Investigador/a), Martínez Giralt, X. (Investigador/a), Massó, J. (Investigador/a), Olivella, P. (Investigador/a), Perez Castrillo, J. D. (Investigador/a), Ponsati Obiols, C. (Investigador/a) & Vila Carnicero, F. J. (Investigador/a)
Dirección General de Enseñanza Superior e Investigación Científica (DGESIC)
15/12/97 → 15/12/99
Projecte: Projectes i Ajuts a la Recerca

Com citar-ho

@article{f0afdfda17814cacb48cab224a6b1726,

title = "Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings",

abstract = "Some properties of the set of many-to-one stable matchings for firms that have responsive preferences and quotas are not necessarily true when firms' preferences are substitutable. In particular, we provide examples in which firms have substitutable preferences but firms and workers may be {"}single{"} in one stable matching and matched in another one. We identify a set of axioms on firms' preferences guaranteeing that the set of unmatched agents is the same under every stable matching. We also propose a weaker condition than responsiveness, called separability with quotas or q-separability, that together with substitutability implies this set of axioms.",

author = "Jordi Mass{\'o} and Ruth Mart{\'i}nez and Alejandro Neme and Jorge Oviedo",

note = "Financial support through a grant from the Programa de Cooperaci{\'o}n Cienti{\'i}fica Iberoamericana is acknowledged. The work of Jordi Mass{\'o} is also partially supported by Research Grants PB96-1192 from the Direcci{\'o}n General de Investigaci{\'o}n Cient{\'i}fica y T{\'e}cnica, Spanish Ministry of Education, and SGR98-62 from the Comissionat per Universitats i Recerca de la Generalitat de Catalunya. The paper was partially written while Alejandro Neme was visiting the UAB under a sabbatical fellowship from the Spanish Ministry of Education.",

year = "2000",

month = mar,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1006/jeth.1999.2586",

language = "English",

volume = "91",

pages = "91--105",

journal = "Journal of economic theory",

issn = "0022-0531",

publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings

AU - Massó, Jordi

AU - Martínez, Ruth

AU - Neme, Alejandro

AU - Oviedo, Jorge

N1 - Financial support through a grant from the Programa de Cooperación Cientiífica Iberoamericana is acknowledged. The work of Jordi Massó is also partially supported by Research Grants PB96-1192 from the Dirección General de Investigación Científica y Técnica, Spanish Ministry of Education, and SGR98-62 from the Comissionat per Universitats i Recerca de la Generalitat de Catalunya. The paper was partially written while Alejandro Neme was visiting the UAB under a sabbatical fellowship from the Spanish Ministry of Education.

PY - 2000/3/1

Y1 - 2000/3/1

N2 - Some properties of the set of many-to-one stable matchings for firms that have responsive preferences and quotas are not necessarily true when firms' preferences are substitutable. In particular, we provide examples in which firms have substitutable preferences but firms and workers may be "single" in one stable matching and matched in another one. We identify a set of axioms on firms' preferences guaranteeing that the set of unmatched agents is the same under every stable matching. We also propose a weaker condition than responsiveness, called separability with quotas or q-separability, that together with substitutability implies this set of axioms.

AB - Some properties of the set of many-to-one stable matchings for firms that have responsive preferences and quotas are not necessarily true when firms' preferences are substitutable. In particular, we provide examples in which firms have substitutable preferences but firms and workers may be "single" in one stable matching and matched in another one. We identify a set of axioms on firms' preferences guaranteeing that the set of unmatched agents is the same under every stable matching. We also propose a weaker condition than responsiveness, called separability with quotas or q-separability, that together with substitutability implies this set of axioms.

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0002246612

U2 - 10.1006/jeth.1999.2586

DO - 10.1006/jeth.1999.2586

M3 - Article

SN - 0022-0531

VL - 91

SP - 91

EP - 105

JO - Journal of economic theory

JF - Journal of economic theory

IS - 1

ER -

Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings

Resum

Accés al document

Altres arxius i enllaços

Fingerprint

Projectes

Cooperació i Competència: Estudis sobre el comportament estratègic i el disseny institucional

Com citar-ho