TY - JOUR
T1 - Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
AU - Barberà, Salvador
AU - Berga, Dolors
AU - Moreno, Bernardo
N1 - Salvador Barberà acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI), through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S) and (SEV-2011-0075), from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness and FEDER through grants ECO2017-83534-P and PID2020-116771GB-I00, and from the Generalitat de Catalunya, through grant 2017SGR—0711. Dolors Berga acknowledges the support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness through grants ECO2016-76255-P and PID2019-106642GB-I00. Bernardo Moreno acknowledges the support from the Consejería de Economía y Conocimiento, Junta de Andalucía through grant UMA18-FEDERJA-130. The latter two authors thank the MOMA network. The usual disclaimer applies.
PY - 2022/1
Y1 - 2022/1
N2 - We study mechanisms that operate in interdependent values environments. We show that when defined on knit and strict environments, only constant mechanisms can be ex post incentive compatible. Knitness is also necessary for this result to hold for mechanisms with two alternatives in the range. For partially knit and strict environments, we prove that ex post incentive compatibility extends to groups, and that strategy-proofness implies strong group strategy-proofness in the special case of private values. The results extend to mechanisms operating on non-strict domains under an additional requirement of respectfulness. We discuss examples of environments where our theorems apply.
AB - We study mechanisms that operate in interdependent values environments. We show that when defined on knit and strict environments, only constant mechanisms can be ex post incentive compatible. Knitness is also necessary for this result to hold for mechanisms with two alternatives in the range. For partially knit and strict environments, we prove that ex post incentive compatibility extends to groups, and that strategy-proofness implies strong group strategy-proofness in the special case of private values. The results extend to mechanisms operating on non-strict domains under an additional requirement of respectfulness. We discuss examples of environments where our theorems apply.
KW - Allocation problems
KW - Ex post incentive compatibility
KW - Interdependent types
KW - Jury decisions
KW - Mechanisms
KW - Pareto efficiency
KW - Preference functions
KW - Strategy-proofness
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85119176755&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/4c8e7482-271f-3536-b25d-d3a3c4e6e721/
UR - https://bse.eu/research/working-papers/restricted-environments-and-incentive-compatibility-interdependent-values
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.008
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.008
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85119176755
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 131
SP - 1
EP - 28
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
ER -