Pivotal Voters: A New Proof of Arrow's Theorem

Salvador Barberá

doi:10.1016/0165-1765(80)90050-6

Pivotal Voters: A New Proof of Arrow's Theorem

Salvador Barberá^*

^*Autor corresponent d’aquest treball

Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica

Universitat del Pais Basc (UPV/EHU)

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Resum

This paper presents a new proof of Arrow's 'General Possibility Theorem', focusing on the way how 'social' preferences change in response to changes in the preferences of individuals, under given social welfare functions.

Idioma original	Anglès
Pàgines (de-a)	13-16
Revista	Economics Letters
Volum	6
Número	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(80)90050-6
Estat de la publicació	Publicada - 1980

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10.1016/0165-1765(80)90050-6

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title = "Pivotal Voters: A New Proof of Arrow's Theorem",

abstract = "This paper presents a new proof of Arrow's 'General Possibility Theorem', focusing on the way how 'social' preferences change in response to changes in the preferences of individuals, under given social welfare functions.",

author = "Salvador Barber{\'a}",

year = "1980",

doi = "10.1016/0165-1765(80)90050-6",

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journal = "Economics Letters",

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T2 - A New Proof of Arrow's Theorem

AU - Barberá, Salvador

PY - 1980

Y1 - 1980

N2 - This paper presents a new proof of Arrow's 'General Possibility Theorem', focusing on the way how 'social' preferences change in response to changes in the preferences of individuals, under given social welfare functions.

AB - This paper presents a new proof of Arrow's 'General Possibility Theorem', focusing on the way how 'social' preferences change in response to changes in the preferences of individuals, under given social welfare functions.

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0012940649

U2 - 10.1016/0165-1765(80)90050-6

DO - 10.1016/0165-1765(80)90050-6

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0012940649

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 6

SP - 13

EP - 16

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 1

ER -

Pivotal Voters: A New Proof of Arrow's Theorem

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