Organizational Structure and Technological Investment

Inés Macho-Stadler; Noriaki Matsushima; Ryusuke Shinohara

doi:10.1111/joie.12277

Organizational Structure and Technological Investment

Inés Macho-Stadler, Noriaki Matsushima^*, Ryusuke Shinohara

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Resum

We analyze firms’ decisions on their vertical organization, taking into account the characteristics of both the final good competition and the R&D process. We consider two vertical chains where upstream sectors invest in R&D. Such investment determines the production costs of the downstream sector and has spillovers on the production and the investment costs of the rival. In a general setting, we show that the equilibrium organizational structure depends on whether the situation considered belongs to one of four possible cases. We study how final good market competition, R&D spillover, and R&D incentives interact to determine the equilibrium vertical structure.

Idioma original	Anglès
Pàgines (de-a)	785-816
Nombre de pàgines	32
Revista	Journal of industrial economics
Volum	69
Número	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12277
Estat de la publicació	Publicada - de des. 2021

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10.1111/joie.12277Llicència: Creative Commons Reconeixement No Comercial - Sense Obra Derivada

https://ddd.uab.cat/record/255785Llicència: Creative Commons Reconeixement No Comercial - Sense Obra Derivada

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Link to publication in Scopus

Análisis teórico y empírico del comportamiento de individuos y empresas con especial énfasis en innovación, salud y el mercado digital
Perez Castrillo, J. D. (PI), Macho Stadler, I. (Investigador/a), Martínez Giralt, X. (Investigador/a), Olivella, P. (Investigador/a), Piolatto, A. (Investigador/a) & Stockler Barbosa, G. G. (Col.laborador/a)
Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (MICINN)
1/01/19 → 30/09/22
Projecte: Projectes i Ajuts a la Recerca

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title = "Organizational Structure and Technological Investment",

abstract = "We analyze firms{\textquoteright} decisions on their vertical organization, taking into account the characteristics of both the final good competition and the R&D process. We consider two vertical chains where upstream sectors invest in R&D. Such investment determines the production costs of the downstream sector and has spillovers on the production and the investment costs of the rival. In a general setting, we show that the equilibrium organizational structure depends on whether the situation considered belongs to one of four possible cases. We study how final good market competition, R&D spillover, and R&D incentives interact to determine the equilibrium vertical structure.",

author = "In{\'e}s Macho-Stadler and Noriaki Matsushima and Ryusuke Shinohara",

note = "We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS), KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP15H03349, JP15H05728, JP17H00984, JP18H00847, JP18K01519, JP18K01593, JP19H01483, and JP20H05631, the Generalitat de Catalunya grant 2017SGR‐711, the Severo Ochoa Programme grant number CEX2019‐915‐S, the MCIU and FEDER PGC2018‐094348‐B‐I00, Osaka University for its International Joint Research Promotion Program, and the program of the Joint Usage/Research Center for Behavioral Economics at the ISER, Osaka University.",

year = "2021",

month = dec,

doi = "10.1111/joie.12277",

language = "English",

volume = "69",

pages = "785--816",

journal = "Journal of industrial economics",

issn = "0022-1821",

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T1 - Organizational Structure and Technological Investment

AU - Macho-Stadler, Inés

AU - Matsushima, Noriaki

AU - Shinohara, Ryusuke

N1 - We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS), KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP15H03349, JP15H05728, JP17H00984, JP18H00847, JP18K01519, JP18K01593, JP19H01483, and JP20H05631, the Generalitat de Catalunya grant 2017SGR‐711, the Severo Ochoa Programme grant number CEX2019‐915‐S, the MCIU and FEDER PGC2018‐094348‐B‐I00, Osaka University for its International Joint Research Promotion Program, and the program of the Joint Usage/Research Center for Behavioral Economics at the ISER, Osaka University.

PY - 2021/12

Y1 - 2021/12

N2 - We analyze firms’ decisions on their vertical organization, taking into account the characteristics of both the final good competition and the R&D process. We consider two vertical chains where upstream sectors invest in R&D. Such investment determines the production costs of the downstream sector and has spillovers on the production and the investment costs of the rival. In a general setting, we show that the equilibrium organizational structure depends on whether the situation considered belongs to one of four possible cases. We study how final good market competition, R&D spillover, and R&D incentives interact to determine the equilibrium vertical structure.

AB - We analyze firms’ decisions on their vertical organization, taking into account the characteristics of both the final good competition and the R&D process. We consider two vertical chains where upstream sectors invest in R&D. Such investment determines the production costs of the downstream sector and has spillovers on the production and the investment costs of the rival. In a general setting, we show that the equilibrium organizational structure depends on whether the situation considered belongs to one of four possible cases. We study how final good market competition, R&D spillover, and R&D incentives interact to determine the equilibrium vertical structure.

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U2 - 10.1111/joie.12277

DO - 10.1111/joie.12277

M3 - Article

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VL - 69

SP - 785

EP - 816

JO - Journal of industrial economics

JF - Journal of industrial economics

IS - 4

ER -

Organizational Structure and Technological Investment

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Análisis teórico y empírico del comportamiento de individuos y empresas con especial énfasis en innovación, salud y el mercado digital

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