On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles

Ruth Martínez; Jordi Massó; Alejandro Neme; Jorge Oviedo

doi:10.1007/s00182-007-0080-7

On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles

Ruth Martínez, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme, Jorge Oviedo

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Resum

For the many-to-one matching model we give a procedure to partition the set of substitutable preference profiles into equivalence classes with the property that all profiles in the same class have the same set of stable matchings. This partition allows to reduce the amount of information required by centralized stable mechanisms. © 2007 Springer Verlag.

Idioma original	Anglès
Pàgines (de-a)	497-518
Revista	International Journal of Game Theory
Volum	36
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0080-7
Estat de la publicació	Publicada - 1 de març 2008

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10.1007/s00182-007-0080-7

https://ddd.uab.cat/record/143634Llicència: C In Copyright

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title = "On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles",

abstract = "For the many-to-one matching model we give a procedure to partition the set of substitutable preference profiles into equivalence classes with the property that all profiles in the same class have the same set of stable matchings. This partition allows to reduce the amount of information required by centralized stable mechanisms. ",

keywords = "Matching, Semilattice, Stability, Substitutable preferences",

author = "Ruth Mart{\'i}nez and Jordi Mass{\'o} and Alejandro Neme and Jorge Oviedo",

year = "2008",

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doi = "10.1007/s00182-007-0080-7",

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T1 - On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles

AU - Martínez, Ruth

AU - Massó, Jordi

AU - Neme, Alejandro

AU - Oviedo, Jorge

PY - 2008/3/1

Y1 - 2008/3/1

N2 - For the many-to-one matching model we give a procedure to partition the set of substitutable preference profiles into equivalence classes with the property that all profiles in the same class have the same set of stable matchings. This partition allows to reduce the amount of information required by centralized stable mechanisms.

AB - For the many-to-one matching model we give a procedure to partition the set of substitutable preference profiles into equivalence classes with the property that all profiles in the same class have the same set of stable matchings. This partition allows to reduce the amount of information required by centralized stable mechanisms.

KW - Matching

KW - Semilattice

KW - Stability

KW - Substitutable preferences

U2 - 10.1007/s00182-007-0080-7

DO - 10.1007/s00182-007-0080-7

M3 - Article

SN - 0020-7276

VL - 36

SP - 497

EP - 518

JO - International Journal of Game Theory

JF - International Journal of Game Theory

ER -

On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles

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