On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem

Jordi Massó; Shurojit Chatterji; Shigehiro Serizawa

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.017

On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem

Jordi Massó, Shurojit Chatterji, Shigehiro Serizawa^*

^*Autor corresponent d’aquest treball

Producció científica: Contribució a revista › Article › Recerca › Avaluat per experts

3 Descàrregues (Pure)

Resum

Considerem regles a prova d'estratègia que operen en un domini ric de perfils de preferències en una configuració on múltiples béns privats s'han d'assignar a un conjunt d'agents amb drets i on les preferències mostren saciació. Mostrem que si la regla és, a més, només tops, unilateral i individualment racional pel que fa als drets, llavors les preferències del domini han de satisfer una variant de unicitat (referida com unicitat multidimensional en relació als drets). També proporcionem un revers d'aquesta troballa principal. Resulta que aquest domini coincideix amb el ja identificat en una configuració general amb béns públics. Relacionem el domini de preferències unicitàries i a prova d'estratègia en relació als drets amb dominis restringits ben coneguts amb béns privats sota els quals hi ha regles no trivials i a prova d'estratègia.

Idioma original	Anglès
Pàgines (de-a)	48-70
Nombre de pàgines	23
Revista	Games and Economic Behavior
Volum	150
Data online anticipada	3 de des. 2024
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.017
Estat de la publicació	Publicada - de març 2025

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10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.017Llicència: Creative Commons Reconeixement

https://ddd.uab.cat/record/308228

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1 Actiu

INFORMACION, DECISIONES, Y RIESGO EN ENTORNOS COMPLEJOS: AVANCES TEORICOS Y UNA NUEVA PERSPECTIVA EMPIRICA
Massó, J. (Investigador/a principal), Milán Solé, P. (Co-Investigador/a Principal), Barberà, S. (Col.laborador/a), Payró, F. (Investigador/a), Rojas Duenas, L. E. (Investigador/a), Sancho, F. (Investigador/a), Pérez Martel, E. (Col.laborador/a), Rapone , T. (Col.laborador/a) & Bayer , P. (Investigador/a)
1/09/24 → 31/12/27
Projecte: Projectes i Ajuts a la Recerca
ELECCION SOCIAL, REDES Y BIENESTAR: TEORIA Y APLICACIONES
Massó, J. (Investigador/a principal), Barberà, S. (Col.laborador/a), Sancho, F. (Col.laborador/a), Guerra Hernandez, A. I. (Investigador/a), Milán Solé, P. (Investigador/a), Vila Carnicero, F. J. (Investigador/a), Payró, F. (Col.laborador/a), Lleonart Anguix, M. (Col.laborador/a), Chatterji, S. (Col.laborador/a), Bramuelle, Y. (Col.laborador/a) & Rojas Duenas, L. E. (Col.laborador/a)
1/09/21 → 31/08/24
Projecte: Projectes i Ajuts a la Recerca

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title = "On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem",

abstract = "We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where multiple private goods have to be assigned to a set of agents with entitlements and where preferences display satiation. We show that if the rule is in addition tops-only, same-sided and individually rational with respect to the entitlements, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as multi-dimensional single-peakedness relative to the entitlements). We also provide a converse of this main finding. It turns out that this domain coincides with the one already identified in a general set up with public goods. We relate the domain of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences relative to the entitlements to well-known restricted domains with private goods under which non-trivial and strategy-proof rules do exist.",

keywords = "Multi-dimensional single-peakedness, Strategy-proofness",

author = "Jordi Mass{\'o} and Shurojit Chatterji and Shigehiro Serizawa",

note = "We are grateful to Huaxia Zeng, an Associate Editor and three referees for comments and suggestions that led to an improvement of the paper. ",

year = "2025",

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doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.017",

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AU - Massó, Jordi

AU - Chatterji, Shurojit

AU - Serizawa, Shigehiro

N1 - We are grateful to Huaxia Zeng, an Associate Editor and three referees for comments and suggestions that led to an improvement of the paper.

PY - 2025/3

Y1 - 2025/3

N2 - We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where multiple private goods have to be assigned to a set of agents with entitlements and where preferences display satiation. We show that if the rule is in addition tops-only, same-sided and individually rational with respect to the entitlements, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as multi-dimensional single-peakedness relative to the entitlements). We also provide a converse of this main finding. It turns out that this domain coincides with the one already identified in a general set up with public goods. We relate the domain of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences relative to the entitlements to well-known restricted domains with private goods under which non-trivial and strategy-proof rules do exist.

AB - We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where multiple private goods have to be assigned to a set of agents with entitlements and where preferences display satiation. We show that if the rule is in addition tops-only, same-sided and individually rational with respect to the entitlements, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as multi-dimensional single-peakedness relative to the entitlements). We also provide a converse of this main finding. It turns out that this domain coincides with the one already identified in a general set up with public goods. We relate the domain of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences relative to the entitlements to well-known restricted domains with private goods under which non-trivial and strategy-proof rules do exist.

KW - Multi-dimensional single-peakedness

KW - Strategy-proofness

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85211106766

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/63e5a08a-adf9-32e5-9679-48f46b7ff801/

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DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.017

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85211106766

SN - 0899-8256

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SP - 48

EP - 70

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

ER -

On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem

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INFORMACION, DECISIONES, Y RIESGO EN ENTORNOS COMPLEJOS: AVANCES TEORICOS Y UNA NUEVA PERSPECTIVA EMPIRICA

ELECCION SOCIAL, REDES Y BIENESTAR: TEORIA Y APLICACIONES

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