On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency

Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme

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Resum

We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also a subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We study the extensions of approval voting, scoring methods and the Condorcet winner to our setting from the point of view of their internal stability and consistency properties.
Idioma originalEnglish
Pàgines (de-a)83-97
Nombre de pàgines15
RevistaTheory and Decision
Volum84
Número1
DOIs
Estat de la publicacióPublicada - 4 de des. 2017

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