On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good

Jordi Massó; Antonio Nicolò; Arunava Sen; Tradib Sharma; Levent Ülkü

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.003

On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good

Jordi Massó, Antonio Nicolò, Arunava Sen, Tradib Sharma, Levent Ülkü

Indian Statistical Institute

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Resum

We study efficiency and fairness properties of the equal cost sharing with maximal participation (ECSMP) mechanism in the provision of a binary and excludable public good. According to the maximal welfare loss criterion, the ECSMP is optimal within the class of strategyproof, individually rational and no-deficit mechanisms only when there are two agents. In general the ECSMP mechanism is not optimal: we provide a class of mechanisms obtained by symmetric perturbations of ECSMP with strictly lower maximal welfare loss. We show that if one of two possible fairness conditions is additionally imposed, the ECSMP mechanism becomes optimal.

Idioma original	English
Pàgines (de-a)	30-49
Revista	Journal of Economic Theory
Volum	155
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.003
Estat de la publicació	Publicada - 1 de gen. 2015

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10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.003Llicència: C In Copyright

https://ddd.uab.cat/record/182475Llicència: C In Copyright

1 Acabat

Diseño institucional y buenas prácticas de gobierno: teoría, aplicaciones y simulación. INDAGO
Barberà, S. (Investigador/a principal), Ayllon Aragon, G. (Becari/a), Balart Castro, P. (Becari/a), Caramuta ., D. (Becari/a), Filippos , L. (Becari/a), Gjorgjiev, R. (Becari/a), Li , N. (Becari/a), Merlino , L. P. (Becari/a), Ozturk , T. (Becari/a), Bervoets ., S. J. (Investigador/a contractat/da), Beviá Baeza, M. D. C. (Investigador/a contractat/da), Ballester Oyarzun, M. A. (Investigador/a), Brown, D. J. (Investigador/a), Calsamiglia Costa, C. (Investigador/a), Coelho, D. (Investigador/a), Flamand ., S. (Investigador/a), Groenert ., V. (Investigador/a), Haeringer , G. (Investigador/a), Jackson, M. O. (Investigador/a), Massó, J. (Investigador/a), Miralles Asensio, A. (Investigador/a), Mukherjee ., S. (Investigador/a), Neme, A. (Investigador/a), Nicolo, A. (Investigador/a), Nozomu , M. (Investigador/a) & Vila Carnicero, F. J. (Investigador/a)
Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (MEC)
1/01/09 → 30/07/15
Projecte: Projectes i Ajuts a la Recerca

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title = "On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good",

abstract = "We study efficiency and fairness properties of the equal cost sharing with maximal participation (ECSMP) mechanism in the provision of a binary and excludable public good. According to the maximal welfare loss criterion, the ECSMP is optimal within the class of strategyproof, individually rational and no-deficit mechanisms only when there are two agents. In general the ECSMP mechanism is not optimal: we provide a class of mechanisms obtained by symmetric perturbations of ECSMP with strictly lower maximal welfare loss. We show that if one of two possible fairness conditions is additionally imposed, the ECSMP mechanism becomes optimal.",

author = "Jordi Mass{\'o} and Antonio Nicol{\`o} and Arunava Sen and Tradib Sharma and Levent {\"U}lk{\"u}",

note = "Jordi Mass{\'o} acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075) and FEDER grant ECO2008-04756 (Grupo Consilidado-C), and from the Generalitat de Catalunya, through the prize {"}ICREA Academia{"} for excellence in research and grant SGR2009-419. Antonio Nicol{\`o}'s work is partially supported by the project {"}Intelligent preference reasoning for multi-agent decision making{"} (Univ. of Padova)",

year = "2015",

month = jan,

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doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.003",

language = "English",

volume = "155",

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TY - JOUR

T1 - On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good

AU - Massó, Jordi

AU - Nicolò, Antonio

AU - Sen, Arunava

AU - Sharma, Tradib

AU - Ülkü, Levent

N1 - Jordi Massó acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centers of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075) and FEDER grant ECO2008-04756 (Grupo Consilidado-C), and from the Generalitat de Catalunya, through the prize "ICREA Academia" for excellence in research and grant SGR2009-419. Antonio Nicolò's work is partially supported by the project "Intelligent preference reasoning for multi-agent decision making" (Univ. of Padova)

PY - 2015/1/1

Y1 - 2015/1/1

N2 - We study efficiency and fairness properties of the equal cost sharing with maximal participation (ECSMP) mechanism in the provision of a binary and excludable public good. According to the maximal welfare loss criterion, the ECSMP is optimal within the class of strategyproof, individually rational and no-deficit mechanisms only when there are two agents. In general the ECSMP mechanism is not optimal: we provide a class of mechanisms obtained by symmetric perturbations of ECSMP with strictly lower maximal welfare loss. We show that if one of two possible fairness conditions is additionally imposed, the ECSMP mechanism becomes optimal.

AB - We study efficiency and fairness properties of the equal cost sharing with maximal participation (ECSMP) mechanism in the provision of a binary and excludable public good. According to the maximal welfare loss criterion, the ECSMP is optimal within the class of strategyproof, individually rational and no-deficit mechanisms only when there are two agents. In general the ECSMP mechanism is not optimal: we provide a class of mechanisms obtained by symmetric perturbations of ECSMP with strictly lower maximal welfare loss. We show that if one of two possible fairness conditions is additionally imposed, the ECSMP mechanism becomes optimal.

U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.003

DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.003

M3 - Article

SN - 0022-0531

VL - 155

SP - 30

EP - 49

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

ER -

On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good

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