TY - JOUR
T1 - Multiperson bargaining over two alternatives
AU - Ponsati, Clara
AU - Sákovics, József
PY - 1996/1/1
Y1 - 1996/1/1
N2 - We present a continuous-time model of multiperson bargaining with incomplete information, where only two agreements are possible. We show that under mild informational assumptions, players behave as if they were representing the other players who prefer the same alternative, individually playing a war-of-attrition against a conglomerate player of the opposite side. We also provide a characterization of the perfect Bayesian equilibria in undominated strategies of the game, which yields a unique outcome in most cases. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78, D72, D74. © 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
AB - We present a continuous-time model of multiperson bargaining with incomplete information, where only two agreements are possible. We show that under mild informational assumptions, players behave as if they were representing the other players who prefer the same alternative, individually playing a war-of-attrition against a conglomerate player of the opposite side. We also provide a characterization of the perfect Bayesian equilibria in undominated strategies of the game, which yields a unique outcome in most cases. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78, D72, D74. © 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
U2 - 10.1006/game.1996.0015
DO - 10.1006/game.1996.0015
M3 - Article
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 12
SP - 226
EP - 244
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
ER -