TY - JOUR
T1 - Moral hazard with several agents. The gains from cooperation
AU - Pérez-Castrillo, J. David
AU - Macho-Stadler, Inés
PY - 1993/1/1
Y1 - 1993/1/1
N2 - We consider a situation in which a principal hires two agents whose cooperation is technically profitable and study three models that incorporate different assumptions about the agents' cooperative behavior. We find a close relationship between the agents' commitment capacity and the characteristics of the optimal contract. A greater capacity to cooperate leads to more efficient outcomes. We also show that unless agents form a team, the efficient level of mutual help is not achieved in equilibrium. © 1993.
AB - We consider a situation in which a principal hires two agents whose cooperation is technically profitable and study three models that incorporate different assumptions about the agents' cooperative behavior. We find a close relationship between the agents' commitment capacity and the characteristics of the optimal contract. A greater capacity to cooperate leads to more efficient outcomes. We also show that unless agents form a team, the efficient level of mutual help is not achieved in equilibrium. © 1993.
UR - https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=334575
U2 - 10.1016/0167-7187(93)90037-D
DO - 10.1016/0167-7187(93)90037-D
M3 - Article
SN - 0167-7187
VL - 11
SP - 73
EP - 100
JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization
JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization
ER -