Mechanisms to appoint arbitrator panels or sets of judges by compromise between concerned parties

S. Barberà; Danilo Coelho

Mechanisms to appoint arbitrator panels or sets of judges by compromise between concerned parties

S. Barberà, Danilo Coelho

Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA)

Producció científica: Working Paper › Working paper

1 Descàrregues (Pure)

Resum

We propose mechanisms for two parties with potentially con.icting objectives to jointly select a predetermined number of candidates to occupy decision-making positions. Two leading examples of these situations are: i) the selection of an arbitrator panel by two con.icting .rms, and ii) the bipartisan coalition.s selection of a set of judges to occupy court vacancies. We analyze the e¢ ciency, fairness, and simplicity of equilibrium outcomes in strategic games induced by these mechanisms. Their e¤ectiveness hinges on the parties. preferences over the sets containing the required number of candidates to be chosen.

Idioma original	English
Editor	BSE Working Papers
Pàgines	1-36
Nombre de pàgines	36
Estat de la publicació	Publicada - 5 de juny 2024

Sèrie de publicacions

Nom	BSE Working Papers
Núm.	1442

Accés al document

https://bse.eu/research/working-papers/mechanisms-appoint-arbitrator-panels-or-sets-judges-compromise-between

ELECCION SOCIAL, REDES Y BIENESTAR: TEORIA Y APLICACIONES
Massó, J. (Investigador/a principal), Barberà, S. (Col.laborador/a), Sancho, F. (Col.laborador/a), Guerra Hernandez, A. I. (Investigador/a), Milán Solé, P. (Investigador/a), Vila Carnicero, F. J. (Investigador/a), Payró, F. (Col.laborador/a), Lleonart Anguix, M. (Col.laborador/a), Chatterji, S. (Col.laborador/a), Bramuelle, Y. (Col.laborador/a) & Rojas Duenas, L. E. (Col.laborador/a)
1/09/21 → 31/08/24
Projecte: Projectes i Ajuts a la Recerca
Diseño institucional y buenas prácticas de gobierno: teoría, aplicaciones y simulación. INDAGO
Barberà, S. (Investigador/a principal), Ayllon Aragon, G. (Becari/a), Balart Castro, P. (Becari/a), Caramuta ., D. (Becari/a), Filippos , L. (Becari/a), Gjorgjiev, R. (Becari/a), Li , N. (Becari/a), Merlino , L. P. (Becari/a), Ozturk , T. (Becari/a), Bervoets ., S. J. (Investigador/a contractat/da), Beviá Baeza, M. D. C. (Investigador/a contractat/da), Ballester Oyarzun, M. A. (Investigador/a), Brown, D. J. (Investigador/a), Calsamiglia Costa, C. (Investigador/a), Coelho, D. (Investigador/a), Flamand ., S. (Investigador/a), Groenert ., V. (Investigador/a), Haeringer , G. (Investigador/a), Jackson, M. O. (Investigador/a), Massó, J. (Investigador/a), Miralles Asensio, A. (Investigador/a), Mukherjee ., S. (Investigador/a), Neme, A. (Investigador/a), Nicolo, A. (Investigador/a), Nozomu , M. (Investigador/a) & Vila Carnicero, F. J. (Investigador/a)
Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (MEC)
1/01/09 → 30/07/15
Projecte: Projectes i Ajuts a la Recerca

Com citar-ho

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abstract = "We propose mechanisms for two parties with potentially con.icting objectives to jointly select a predetermined number of candidates to occupy decision-making positions. Two leading examples of these situations are: i) the selection of an arbitrator panel by two con.icting .rms, and ii) the bipartisan coalition.s selection of a set of judges to occupy court vacancies. We analyze the e¢ ciency, fairness, and simplicity of equilibrium outcomes in strategic games induced by these mechanisms. Their e¤ectiveness hinges on the parties. preferences over the sets containing the required number of candidates to be chosen. ",

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KW - Unanimity Compromise Set

KW - Top Compromise

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Mechanisms to appoint arbitrator panels or sets of judges by compromise between concerned parties

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Projectes

ELECCION SOCIAL, REDES Y BIENESTAR: TEORIA Y APLICACIONES

Diseño institucional y buenas prácticas de gobierno: teoría, aplicaciones y simulación. INDAGO

Com citar-ho