Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes

Salvador Barberà; Jordi Massò; Alejandro Neme

doi:10.1007/s003550050146

Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes

Salvador Barberà, Jordi Massò, Alejandro Neme

Universidad Nacional de San Luis (UNSL)

Producció científica: Contribució a revista › Article › Recerca › Avaluat per experts

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Resum

We characterize the maximal sets of preferences under which generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof. Those domains are defined by a qualified version of single-peakedness, which depends on the distribution of power among agents implied by each generalized median voter scheme. © Springer-Verlag 1999.

Idioma original	Anglès
Pàgines (de-a)	321-336
Nombre de pàgines	16
Revista	Social Choice and Welfare
Volum	16
Número	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050146
Estat de la publicació	Publicada - 1999

Accés al document

10.1007/s003550050146

https://ddd.uab.cat/record/142706

Cooperació i Competència: Estudis sobre el comportament estratègic i el disseny institucional
Barberà, S. (PI), Berga Colom, D. (Becari/a), Bogomolnaia, A. (Becari/a), Caballero Jurado, J. (Becari/a), Villar Febré, J. P. (Becari/a), Beviá Baeza, M. D. C. (Investigador/a), Cardona Coll, D. (Investigador/a), Gonzalez Maestre, M. (Investigador/a), Jelovac ., I. (Investigador/a), Macho Stadler, I. (Investigador/a), Martínez Giralt, X. (Investigador/a), Massó, J. (Investigador/a), Olivella, P. (Investigador/a), Perez Castrillo, J. D. (Investigador/a), Ponsati Obiols, C. (Investigador/a) & Vila Carnicero, F. J. (Investigador/a)
Dirección General de Enseñanza Superior e Investigación Científica (DGESIC)
15/12/97 → 15/12/99
Projecte: Projectes i Ajuts a la Recerca

Com citar-ho

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title = "Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes",

abstract = "We characterize the maximal sets of preferences under which generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof. Those domains are defined by a qualified version of single-peakedness, which depends on the distribution of power among agents implied by each generalized median voter scheme.",

author = "Salvador Barber{\`a} and Jordi Mass{\`o} and Alejandro Neme",

note = "Financial support through a grant from the Programa de Cooperaci{\'o}n Cient{\'i}fica Iberoamericana is acknowledged. The work of S. Barber{\`a} and J. Masso is also partially supported by Research Grants PB96-1192 from the Direcci{\'o}n General de Investigaci{\'o}n Cient{\'i}fica y T{\'e}cnica, Spanish Ministry of Education, and SGR96-75 from the Comissionat per Universitats i Recerca de la Generalit{\"a}t de Catalunya.",

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doi = "10.1007/s003550050146",

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T1 - Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes

AU - Barberà, Salvador

AU - Massò, Jordi

AU - Neme, Alejandro

N1 - Financial support through a grant from the Programa de Cooperación Científica Iberoamericana is acknowledged. The work of S. Barberà and J. Masso is also partially supported by Research Grants PB96-1192 from the Dirección General de Investigación Científica y Técnica, Spanish Ministry of Education, and SGR96-75 from the Comissionat per Universitats i Recerca de la Generalität de Catalunya.

PY - 1999

Y1 - 1999

N2 - We characterize the maximal sets of preferences under which generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof. Those domains are defined by a qualified version of single-peakedness, which depends on the distribution of power among agents implied by each generalized median voter scheme.

AB - We characterize the maximal sets of preferences under which generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof. Those domains are defined by a qualified version of single-peakedness, which depends on the distribution of power among agents implied by each generalized median voter scheme.

U2 - 10.1007/s003550050146

DO - 10.1007/s003550050146

M3 - Article

SN - 0176-1714

VL - 16

SP - 321

EP - 336

JO - Social Choice and Welfare

JF - Social Choice and Welfare

IS - 2

ER -

Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes

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