TY - JOUR
T1 - Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem
AU - Massó, Jordi
AU - Neme, Alejandro
PY - 2001/1/1
Y1 - 2001/1/1
N2 - The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, then the uniform allocation rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. We identify the maximal set of preferences, containing the set of single-peaked preferences, under which there exists at least one rule satisfying the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, and strong symmetry. In addition, we show that our characterization implies a slightly weaker version of Ching and Serizawa's (1998) result. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D78, D63. © 2001 Academic Press.
AB - The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, then the uniform allocation rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. We identify the maximal set of preferences, containing the set of single-peaked preferences, under which there exists at least one rule satisfying the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, and strong symmetry. In addition, we show that our characterization implies a slightly weaker version of Ching and Serizawa's (1998) result. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D78, D63. © 2001 Academic Press.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0035197030
U2 - 10.1006/game.2001.0850
DO - 10.1006/game.2001.0850
M3 - Article
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 37
SP - 367
EP - 387
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
ER -