Individual versus Group Strategy-Proofness: When Do They Coincide?

Salvador Barberà; Dolors Berga; Bernardo Moreno

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.006

Individual versus Group Strategy-Proofness: When Do They Coincide?

Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno

Producció científica: Contribució a una revista › Article › Recerca › Avaluat per experts

64 Cites (Scopus)

1 Descàrregues (Pure)

Resum

A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. There are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. We provide conditions on domains guaranteeing that for all rules defined on them, individual and group strategy-proofness become equivalent. We also provide a partial answer regarding the necessity of our conditions.

Idioma original	English
Pàgines (de-a)	1648-1674
Revista	Journal of Economic Theory
Volum	145
Número	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.006
Estat de la publicació	Publicada - de set. 2010

Accés al document

10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.006Llicència: CC BY-NC-ND

Diseño institucional y buenas prácticas de gobierno: teoría, aplicaciones y simulación. INDAGO
Barberà, S. (Investigador/a principal), Ayllon Aragon, G. (Becari/a), Balart Castro, P. (Becari/a), Caramuta ., D. (Becari/a), Filippos , L. (Becari/a), Gjorgjiev, R. (Becari/a), Li , N. (Becari/a), Merlino , L. P. (Becari/a), Ozturk , T. (Becari/a), Bervoets ., S. J. (Investigador/a contractat/da), Beviá Baeza, M. D. C. (Investigador/a contractat/da), Ballester Oyarzun, M. A. (Investigador/a), Brown, D. J. (Investigador/a), Calsamiglia Costa, C. (Investigador/a), Coelho, D. (Investigador/a), Flamand ., S. (Investigador/a), Groenert ., V. (Investigador/a), Haeringer , G. (Investigador/a), Jackson, M. O. (Investigador/a), Massó, J. (Investigador/a), Miralles Asensio, A. (Investigador/a), Mukherjee ., S. (Investigador/a), Neme, A. (Investigador/a), Nicolo, A. (Investigador/a), Nozomu , M. (Investigador/a) & Vila Carnicero, F. J. (Investigador/a)
Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (MEC)
1/01/09 → 30/07/15
Projecte: Projectes i Ajuts a la Recerca

Com citar-ho

@article{57ad314943c241b5b013585f08e9e901,

title = "Individual versus Group Strategy-Proofness: When Do They Coincide?",

abstract = "A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. There are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. We provide conditions on domains guaranteeing that for all rules defined on them, individual and group strategy-proofness become equivalent. We also provide a partial answer regarding the necessity of our conditions. ",

keywords = "Group strategy-proofness, Separable preferences, Sequential inclusion, Single-peaked preferences, Strategy-proofness",

author = "Salvador Barber{\`a} and Dolors Berga and Bernardo Moreno",

note = "We are grateful to three anonymous referees and many colleagues for their useful comments in different congresses and workshops where the paper was presented. Salvador Barber{\`a} gratefully acknowledges support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grant “Consolidated Group-C” ECO2008-04756, and by the Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament d'Universitats, Recerca i Societat de la Informaci{\'o} through the Distinci{\'o} per a la Promoci{\'o} de la Recerca Universit{\`a}ria, grant SGR2009-0419 and the Barcelona GSE Research Network. Dolors Berga acknowledges the support of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grant SEJ2007-60671 and of Generalitat de Catalunya, through grant SGR2009-0189. She also acknowledges the Research Recognition Programme of the Barcelona GSE. Bernardo Moreno acknowledges financial support from Junta de Andaluc{\'i}a through Proyecto de Excelencia 522 and the ECO2008-03674 from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation.",

year = "2010",

month = sep,

doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.006",

language = "English",

volume = "145",

pages = "1648--1674",

journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",

issn = "0022-0531",

publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

number = "5",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Individual versus Group Strategy-Proofness

T2 - When Do They Coincide?

AU - Barberà, Salvador

AU - Berga, Dolors

AU - Moreno, Bernardo

N1 - We are grateful to three anonymous referees and many colleagues for their useful comments in different congresses and workshops where the paper was presented. Salvador Barberà gratefully acknowledges support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grant “Consolidated Group-C” ECO2008-04756, and by the Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament d'Universitats, Recerca i Societat de la Informació through the Distinció per a la Promoció de la Recerca Universitària, grant SGR2009-0419 and the Barcelona GSE Research Network. Dolors Berga acknowledges the support of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grant SEJ2007-60671 and of Generalitat de Catalunya, through grant SGR2009-0189. She also acknowledges the Research Recognition Programme of the Barcelona GSE. Bernardo Moreno acknowledges financial support from Junta de Andalucía through Proyecto de Excelencia 522 and the ECO2008-03674 from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation.

PY - 2010/9

Y1 - 2010/9

N2 - A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. There are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. We provide conditions on domains guaranteeing that for all rules defined on them, individual and group strategy-proofness become equivalent. We also provide a partial answer regarding the necessity of our conditions.

AB - A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. There are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. We provide conditions on domains guaranteeing that for all rules defined on them, individual and group strategy-proofness become equivalent. We also provide a partial answer regarding the necessity of our conditions.

KW - Group strategy-proofness

KW - Separable preferences

KW - Sequential inclusion

KW - Single-peaked preferences

KW - Strategy-proofness

U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.006

DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.006

M3 - Article

SN - 0022-0531

VL - 145

SP - 1648

EP - 1674

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

IS - 5

ER -

Individual versus Group Strategy-Proofness: When Do They Coincide?

Resum

Accés al document

Fingerprint

Projectes

Diseño institucional y buenas prácticas de gobierno: teoría, aplicaciones y simulación. INDAGO

Com citar-ho