TY - JOUR
T1 - How to Choose a Non-Controversial List with k Names
AU - Barberà, Salvador
AU - Coelho, Danilo
N1 - We thank Carmen Bevia, Joan Maria Esteban, John Weymark, William Gehrlein, Bernard Grofman, Matthew Jackson, Andreu Mas-Colell, Remzi Sanver and three anonymous referees for useful comments. We would also like to thank seminar audience at the The 2006 Annual Meetting of Society for Social Choice and Welfare.
PY - 2008/6
Y1 - 2008/6
N2 - Barberà and Coelho (WP 264, CREA-Barcelona Economics, 2007) documented six screening rules associated with the rule of k names that are used by diferent institutions around the world. Here, we study whether these screening rules satisfy stability. A set is said to be a weak Condorcet set à la Gehrlein (Math Soc Sci 10:199-209) if no candidate in this set can be defeated by any candidate from outside the set on the basis of simple majority rule. We say that a screening rule is stable if it always selects a weak Condorcet set whenever such set exists. We show that all of the six procedures which are used in reality do violate stability if the voters do not act strategically. We then show that there are screening rules which satisfy stability. Finally, we provide two results that can explain the widespread use of unstable screening rules. © 2007 Springer-Verlag.
AB - Barberà and Coelho (WP 264, CREA-Barcelona Economics, 2007) documented six screening rules associated with the rule of k names that are used by diferent institutions around the world. Here, we study whether these screening rules satisfy stability. A set is said to be a weak Condorcet set à la Gehrlein (Math Soc Sci 10:199-209) if no candidate in this set can be defeated by any candidate from outside the set on the basis of simple majority rule. We say that a screening rule is stable if it always selects a weak Condorcet set whenever such set exists. We show that all of the six procedures which are used in reality do violate stability if the voters do not act strategically. We then show that there are screening rules which satisfy stability. Finally, we provide two results that can explain the widespread use of unstable screening rules. © 2007 Springer-Verlag.
U2 - 10.1007/s00355-007-0268-6
DO - 10.1007/s00355-007-0268-6
M3 - Article
SN - 0176-1714
VL - 31
SP - 79
EP - 96
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
ER -