Games of influence in climate change negotiations: Modelling interactions

Pierre Courtois, Tarik Tazdaït

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Resum

We present an integrated framework for structuring and evaluating dynamic climate change decision-making taking into account influential processes occurring during negotiation rounds. Imitation, persuasion and dissuasion are considered. To represent negotiation outcomes, we define a stochastic model derived from concepts of thermodynamics. We use the master equation to describe games of influence. We illustrate the model by simulating the formation and the evolution of a cooperative coalition in the course of a negotiation round. We derive conditions for the emergence and the enlargement of a cooperative agreement. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Idioma originalAnglès
Pàgines (de-a)301-314
RevistaEcological Modelling
Volum204
Número3-4
DOIs
Estat de la publicacióPublicada - 16 de juny 2007

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