El concepto jurídico de la persona y la filosofía del "impersonal"

Producció científica: Contribució a revistaArticleRecercaAvaluat per experts

3 Descàrregues (Pure)

Resum

The article focuses on presenting three arguments that range from less to more in terms of their radical stance on the current legal definition of person. The contribution of the first argument to this discussion lies mainly with a clarification of terminology. In the second argument, Roberto Esposito, despite considering replacing "someone" with "something" and saving humanity as a result, does not surpass his teacher Simone Weil. She is far more important, thanks to the impact of her personality, her qualities as a writer and her radicalism. In the third argument, Simone Weil provides a demonstration of intellectual power that makes one shudder. Her writing reflects a consistent mind, at times out of reach, but her idea of a "philosophy of the impersonal" is unacceptable. Every human being has impersonal elements, such as language, and personal elements, including their manner of speaking and writing. A world without these two elements is simply inconceivable.
Títol traduït de la contribucióThe concept of person under the law and the philosophy of "impersonal"
Idioma originalEspanyol
Pàgines (de-a)278-289
RevistaPersona y Bioética
Volum19
Número2
Estat de la publicacióPublicada - de nov. 2015

Fingerprint

Navegar pels temes de recerca de 'El concepto jurídico de la persona y la filosofía del "impersonal"'. Junts formen un fingerprint únic.

Com citar-ho