Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information

Geoffroy de Clippel, David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein

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Resum

We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible. © 2011.
Idioma originalAnglès
Pàgines (de-a)413-423
RevistaGames and Economic Behavior
Volum75
Número1
DOIs
Estat de la publicacióPublicada - 1 de maig 2012

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