TY - JOUR
T1 - Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information
AU - de Clippel, Geoffroy
AU - Pérez-Castrillo, David
AU - Wettstein, David
PY - 2012/5/1
Y1 - 2012/5/1
N2 - We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible. © 2011.
AB - We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible. © 2011.
KW - Asymmetric information
KW - Egalitarian equivalence
KW - Pareto efficiency
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2011.10.005
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2011.10.005
M3 - Article
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 75
SP - 413
EP - 423
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 1
ER -