Compromising on compromise rules

Salvador Barberà; Danilo Coelho

doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12401

Compromising on compromise rules

Salvador Barberà, Danilo Coelho^*

^*Autor corresponent d’aquest treball

Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA)

Producció científica: Contribució a revista › Article › Recerca › Avaluat per experts

9 Cites (Scopus)

1 Descàrregues (Pure)

Resum

We propose three mechanisms to reach compromise between two opposing parties. They are based on the use of Rules of k Names, whereby one of the parties proposes a shortlist and the other chooses from it. Methods of this class are used in practice to appoint Supreme Court justices and have been recently proposed for arbitration selection processes. Those we suggest are flexible and allow the parties to participate in the endogenous determination of the role of proposer and the shortlist size. They involve few stages, implement the Unanimity Compromise Set, and are robust to the strategic inclusion of candidates.

Idioma original	Anglès
Pàgines (de-a)	95-112
Nombre de pàgines	18
Revista	RAND Journal of Economics
Volum	53
Número	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12401
Estat de la publicació	Publicada - 24 de gen. 2022

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10.1111/1756-2171.12401Llicència: C In Copyright

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1 Acabat

ELECCION SOCIAL, REDES Y BIENESTAR: TEORIA Y APLICACIONES
Massó, J. (PI), Barberà, S. (Col.laborador/a), Sancho, F. (Col.laborador/a), Guerra Hernandez, A. I. (Investigador/a), Milán Solé, P. (Investigador/a), Vila Carnicero, F. J. (Investigador/a), Payró, F. (Col.laborador/a), Lleonart Anguix, M. (Col.laborador/a), Chatterji, S. (Col.laborador/a), Bramuelle, Y. (Col.laborador/a) & Rojas Duenas, L. E. (Col.laborador/a)
1/09/21 → 31/08/24
Projecte: Projectes i Ajuts a la Recerca

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title = "Compromising on compromise rules",

abstract = "We propose three mechanisms to reach compromise between two opposing parties. They are based on the use of Rules of k Names, whereby one of the parties proposes a shortlist and the other chooses from it. Methods of this class are used in practice to appoint Supreme Court justices and have been recently proposed for arbitration selection processes. Those we suggest are flexible and allow the parties to participate in the endogenous determination of the role of proposer and the shortlist size. They involve few stages, implement the Unanimity Compromise Set, and are robust to the strategic inclusion of candidates.",

keywords = "The Unanimity Compromise Set, Compromise Rule of k Names, Shortlisting Contest, Alternate Shortlists, Shortlisting, Voting by Alternating Offers, Vetoes and Fallback Bargaining",

author = "Salvador Barber{\`a} and Danilo Coelho",

note = "An earlier version of this article has been circulated under the title “On the selection of compromise arbitrators”. We thank Andrzej Skrzypacz, Douglas Bernheim, Florian Brandl, Egor Ianovski, Herv{\'e} Moulin, Matthew Jackson, Fuhito Kojima, Raul Lopez, Matias Nunez, Remzi Sanver, and Arkadii Slinko as well as participants at the Online Social Choice Seminar Series in 2020 organized by the Centre for Mathematical Social Science and Matthew Jackson's discussion group seminar in 2019 at Stanford University for useful comments. ",

year = "2022",

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AU - Coelho, Danilo

N1 - An earlier version of this article has been circulated under the title “On the selection of compromise arbitrators”. We thank Andrzej Skrzypacz, Douglas Bernheim, Florian Brandl, Egor Ianovski, Hervé Moulin, Matthew Jackson, Fuhito Kojima, Raul Lopez, Matias Nunez, Remzi Sanver, and Arkadii Slinko as well as participants at the Online Social Choice Seminar Series in 2020 organized by the Centre for Mathematical Social Science and Matthew Jackson's discussion group seminar in 2019 at Stanford University for useful comments.

PY - 2022/1/24

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AB - We propose three mechanisms to reach compromise between two opposing parties. They are based on the use of Rules of k Names, whereby one of the parties proposes a shortlist and the other chooses from it. Methods of this class are used in practice to appoint Supreme Court justices and have been recently proposed for arbitration selection processes. Those we suggest are flexible and allow the parties to participate in the endogenous determination of the role of proposer and the shortlist size. They involve few stages, implement the Unanimity Compromise Set, and are robust to the strategic inclusion of candidates.

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KW - Compromise Rule of k Names

KW - Shortlisting Contest

KW - Alternate Shortlists

KW - Shortlisting

KW - Voting by Alternating Offers

KW - Vetoes and Fallback Bargaining

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Compromising on compromise rules

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