TY - JOUR
T1 - An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
AU - Berga, Dolors
AU - Bergantiños, Gustavo
AU - Massó, Jordi
AU - Neme, Alejandro
PY - 2007/9/1
Y1 - 2007/9/1
N2 - We consider the problem of a society whose members choose, with a voting by committees, a subset of new members from a given set of candidates. After knowing the elected candidates, former members may decide to either stay or exit the society. We analyze the voting behavior of members who take into account the effect of their votes not only on the elected candidates, but also on the final composition of the society. For additive and monotonic preferences with dichotomous bads we construct a strategy profile that is an undominated pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the induced voting game. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
AB - We consider the problem of a society whose members choose, with a voting by committees, a subset of new members from a given set of candidates. After knowing the elected candidates, former members may decide to either stay or exit the society. We analyze the voting behavior of members who take into account the effect of their votes not only on the elected candidates, but also on the final composition of the society. For additive and monotonic preferences with dichotomous bads we construct a strategy profile that is an undominated pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the induced voting game. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
KW - Committees
KW - Undominated Nash equilibrium
KW - Voting
UR - http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=2071307
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/34547843051
U2 - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.03.004
DO - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.03.004
M3 - Article
SN - 0165-4896
VL - 54
SP - 152
EP - 175
JO - Mathematical Social Sciences
JF - Mathematical Social Sciences
ER -