TY - JOUR
T1 - Agency-theory and internal-labor-market explanations of bonus payments: Empirical evidence from Spanish firms
AU - Ortín-Ángel, Pedro
AU - Salas-Fumás, Vicente
PY - 1998/1/1
Y1 - 1998/1/1
N2 - This paper combines agency theory and internal-labor-market theories to explain the determinants of bonus payments among a large sample of top and middle managers from Spanish firms. A distinction is made between the decision whether to pay bonus or not and the size of the bonus. The empirical evidence confirms that the two decisions are determined by different factors. The results of the analysis show a trade-off between short-term and long-term incentives (bonuses and promotion opportunities) as well as differences in the pattern of compensation policies across economic sectors and functional areas inside the firm.
AB - This paper combines agency theory and internal-labor-market theories to explain the determinants of bonus payments among a large sample of top and middle managers from Spanish firms. A distinction is made between the decision whether to pay bonus or not and the size of the bonus. The empirical evidence confirms that the two decisions are determined by different factors. The results of the analysis show a trade-off between short-term and long-term incentives (bonuses and promotion opportunities) as well as differences in the pattern of compensation policies across economic sectors and functional areas inside the firm.
U2 - 10.1162/105864098567524
DO - 10.1162/105864098567524
M3 - Article
SN - 1058-6407
VL - 7
SP - 573
EP - 613
JO - Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
JF - Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
IS - 4
ER -