A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games

Salvador Barberà; Anke Gerber

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2006.09.018

A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games

Salvador Barberà, Anke Gerber

University of Zurich (UZH)

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We show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as "resting points" in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.

Idioma original	English
Pàgines (de-a)	85-90
Revista	Economics Letters
Volum	95
Número	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.09.018
Estat de la publicació	Publicada - d’abr. 2007

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10.1016/j.econlet.2006.09.018Llicència: C In Copyright

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title = "A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games",

abstract = "We show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that {"}solutions{"} to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as {"}resting points{"} in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted. ",

keywords = "Coalition formation, Hedonic game, Stability",

author = "Salvador Barber{\`a} and Anke Gerber",

note = "We are grateful to Antoni Calvo and Matthew Jackson for valuable comments. ",

year = "2007",

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AU - Gerber, Anke

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Y1 - 2007/4

N2 - We show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as "resting points" in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.

AB - We show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as "resting points" in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.

KW - Coalition formation

KW - Hedonic game

KW - Stability

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.09.018

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.09.018

M3 - Article

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 95

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A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games

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