LEGISLATIVE TRANSPARENCY IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

THIS RESEARCH INVESTIGATES LEGISLATIVE TRANSPARENCY IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (EP) WHEN THIS INSTITUTIONAL ACTOR PERFORMS LEGISLATIVE AND OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS. TRANSPARENCY IS A KEY CONDITION TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY: IT IS A PREREQUISITE OF DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, IT IS AN ANTIDOTE AGAINST CORRUPTION AND IT IS A KEY INGREDIENT OF GOOD GOVERNANCE. AT THE EU, THE EP IS THE ONLY INSTITUTION DIRECTLY ELECTED BY CITIZENS AND, AS SUCH, IT IS CENTRAL TO THE EU'S ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY. IN ADDITION, AS THE EP HOLDS IMPORTANT LEGISLATIVE AND OVERSIGHT POWERS, ANALYSING TRANSPARENCY-RELATED ACTIVITY WHEN THIS CHAMBER EXERCISES POLICY-MAKING AND OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS IS FULLY PERTINENT. RESEARCH HAS WIDELY INVESTIGATED TRANSPARENCY IN THE EU AND LEGISLATIVE AND OVERSIGHT POLITICS IN THE EP. HOWEVER, THE DETERMINANTS OF TRANSPARENCY SUPPLIED AND DEMANDED BY THE EP ARE NOT WELL-KNOWN. THIS PROJECT WILL PERFORM TWO COMPLEMENTARY STUDIES TO, RESPECTIVELY, IDENTIFY THE DETERMINANTS OF TRANSPARENCY EXERCISED BY THE EP AND TRANSPARENCY DEMANDED BY THE EP FROM THIRD PARTIES. ON THE ONE HAND, RESEARCH HAS EXAMINED EU TRANSPARENCY LOBBY REGULATION AND TRANSPARENCY OF DECISION-MAKING IN INTER-INSTITUTIONAL BARGAINING. YET, WHILE EU LOBBY REGULATION PURSUES TRANSPARENCY TO INCREASE EU LEGITIMACY, THE QUESTION OF UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (MEP) ARE MORE TRANSPARENT ON THEIR LOBBY CONTACTS IS UNDEREXPLORED. WE KNOW FROM PREVIOUS RESEARCH THAT CERTAIN MEPS CHARACTERISTICS INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF REPORTING ON MEETINGS WITH INTEREST REPRESENTATIVES. HOWEVER, RESEARCH IGNORES WHETHER TRANSPARENCY IS ALSO DRIVEN BY CERTAIN PROPERTIES OF INTEREST GROUPS AND POLICIES. TO FILL THIS GAP, THE PROJECT WILL ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF WHAT PROPERTIES OF MEPS, INTEREST GROUPS AND POLICIES INCREASE MEPS’ TRANSPARENCY ON THEIR MEETINGS WITH INTEREST GROUPS. THE PROJECT WILL TEST HYPOTHESES EXPECTING THAT TRANSPARENCY INCREASES WHEN INTEREST GROUPS HAVE A EUROPEAN SCOPE, WHEN THEY DEFEND GENERAL RATHER THAN PRIVATE INTERESTS, WHEN THEY ARE INSIDERS IN THE EU INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM AND WHEN POLICY ISSUES ARE POLARIZED. THESE HYPOTHESES WILL BE TESTED AGAINST EXISTING MODELS BASED ON LEGISLATORS’ PROPERTIES. ON THE OTHER HAND, RESEARCH HAS UNDEREXPLORED THE DETERMINANTS OF TRANSPARENCY DEMANDED BY THE EP WHEN EXERCISING DEMOCRATIC CONTROL. THE PROJECT WILL INVESTIGATE WHAT PROPERTIES OF MEPS AND POLICIES INCREASE EP DEMANDS OF TRANSPARENCY FROM THIRD PARTIES. IT WILL TEST HYPOTHESES EXPECTING THAT MEPS' PARTY POSITION CLOSER TO GAL (IN THE GAL-TAN CULTURAL DIMENSION), THE PARTY'S POPULISM, AND NATIONAL CORRUPTION-MITIGATION REGIMES INCREASE LEGISLATORS' DEMAND FOR TRANSPARENCY. SIMILARLY, MEPS WITH POLICY INFLUENCE AND FROM PARTIES IN THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT ARE EXPECTED TO DECREASE TRANSPARENCY DEMANDS. THE PROJECT IS INNOVATIVE AS IT ADDRESS TRANSPARENCY AS A KEY COMPONENT OF DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, COMBINING A PERSPECTIVE OF THE EP AS AN ‘ACTOR’ (BEHAVING TRANSPARENTLY) AND AS A ‘FORUM’ (DEMANDING TRANSPARENCY). IT ALSO ELABORATES NOVEL THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS ON THE DETERMINANTS OF TRANSPARENCY SUPPLIED AND DEMANDED BY THE EP, EXPECTING TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE LITERATURE ON LEGISLATIVE TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE EP. BOTH STUDIES WILL BE BASED ON QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES. DATA GENERATED BY THE PROJECT WILL BE PUBLISHED IN OPEN ACCESS.