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Diseño institucional y buenas prácticas de gobierno: teoría, aplicaciones y simulación. INDAGO
Barberà, Salvador
(Investigador/a principal)
Ayllon Aragon, Grisel
(Becari/a)
Balart Castro, Pau
(Becari/a)
Caramuta ., Diego
(Becari/a)
Filippos , Louis
(Becari/a)
Gjorgjiev, Riste
(Becari/a)
Li , Nan
(Becari/a)
Merlino , Luca Paolo
(Becari/a)
Ozturk , Tahir
(Becari/a)
Bervoets ., Sebastian James
(Investigador/a contractat/da)
Beviá Baeza, María del Carmen
(Investigador/a contractat/da)
Ballester Oyarzun, Miguel Angel
(Investigador/a)
Brown, Donald J.
(Investigador/a)
Calsamiglia Costa, Caterina
(Investigador/a)
Coelho, Danilo
(Investigador/a)
Flamand ., Sabine
(Investigador/a)
Groenert ., Valeska
(Investigador/a)
Haeringer , Guillaume
(Investigador/a)
Jackson, Matthew O.
(Investigador/a)
Massó, Jordi
(Investigador/a)
Miralles Asensio, Antonio
(Investigador/a)
Mukherjee ., Saptarshi
(Investigador/a)
Neme, Alejandro
(Investigador/a)
Nicolo, Antonio
(Investigador/a)
Nozomu , Muto
(Investigador/a)
Vila Carnicero, Francisco Javier
(Investigador/a)
Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB)
Centre per a l'Estudi de les Organitzacions i les Decisions Econòmiques (CODE)
Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis
Sense entitat
Stanford University
Yale University
Informació general
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Producció científica
(39)
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Ponderació
Alfabèticament
INIS
allocations
37%
amendments
37%
applications
28%
assignments
37%
balance of power
18%
balances
28%
banks
37%
connections
9%
constraints
18%
cooperation
18%
cooperatives
37%
cost
56%
courts
9%
decision making
9%
distribution
9%
econometrics
18%
economics
56%
economy
37%
efficiency
30%
environment
37%
equilibrium
81%
flexibility
37%
houses
37%
incentives
18%
inclusions
18%
information
37%
instability
18%
losses
6%
market
37%
matrices
6%
panels
18%
partition
46%
partition functions
7%
power
56%
probability
12%
range
56%
reduction
9%
replicas
7%
roots
37%
screening
18%
size
41%
solutions
93%
stability
48%
surveys
18%
symmetry
6%
units
14%
utilities
25%
vacancies
9%
vanadium nitrides
12%
vulnerability
18%
Keyphrases
Agenda Manipulation
18%
Amendment Procedure
12%
Arbitrary Domains
18%
Arbitrators
18%
Assignment Game
18%
Buyers
9%
Cartesian Product
9%
Chooser
17%
Coalition Formation
37%
Common Roots
37%
Competitive Equilibrium
37%
Condorcet Winner
6%
Decision Maker
9%
Decision-making Positions
9%
Defined Concepts
6%
Distant Past
6%
Division Problem
18%
Domain Characterization
18%
Domain Restriction
12%
Economic Environment
6%
Egalitarianism
37%
Equilibrium Outcome
9%
Equilibrium Payoffs
14%
Exact Bounds
5%
Excludable Public Goods
18%
Expected Utility
9%
Gains from Trade
9%
Game Analysis
6%
Generalized Assignment Problem
37%
Generalized Median
18%
Gobierno
37%
Group Stability
9%
Group Strategy
7%
Group Strategy-proofness
37%
Hedonic Games
18%
House Allocation
10%
Interesting Rules
6%
K Parameter
6%
Large Classes
6%
Letting
22%
Majority Rule
12%
Majority Voting
6%
Many-to-many
9%
Many-to-one Matching Market
9%
Median Voter
37%
Meritocracy
37%
Nested Structure
9%
New Domains
12%
Officers
18%
Order Restriction
12%
Organizational Structure
37%
Payoff
9%
Power Distribution
7%
Preference for Flexibility
37%
Private Goods
18%
Proof Rules
12%
Proportional Solution
6%
Proposer
18%
Range Domain
18%
Restricted Domain
9%
Rule of k Names
26%
Screening Rules
6%
Seller
9%
Sequential Inclusion
9%
Shapley
9%
Single-crossing
37%
Single-dipped Preferences
37%
Single-peaked Preferences
10%
Single-peakedness
18%
Stable Partition
18%
Stable Set
26%
Stable Structure
18%
Strategic Games
13%
Strategy-proofness
37%
Strict Preference Relation
9%
Subjective Probability
18%
Successive Procedure
12%
System of Linear Inequalities
9%
Tie-breaking
18%
Two-party
9%
Two-stage Process
9%
Uniform Rule
14%
Utility Function
9%
Voting Equilibria
12%
Voting Rules
25%
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Auction
37%
Bayesian
9%
Deductible
56%
Gains from Trade
9%
Incentives
18%
Median
25%
Median Voter
56%
Nash Equilibrium
18%
Organizational Structure
37%
Paradox of Voting
21%
Perfect Competition
37%
Public Goods
18%
Social Welfare Function
56%
Utility Function
37%
Voting Rule
100%
Welfare
6%